Dr Andreas Krieg on State Subversion, Multipolarity, and Middle East Security

Description

welcome to Pikthal House's conversation with Dr andreas Cre my name is Mustafa Warsy and I'm chairman of Pikthal House and this here is Fez Ahmed the uh director of foreign policy at Pikthal House dr cre over here works both as the geopolitical risk consultant with 20 years of experience in the Middle East and North Africa and as associate professor at King's College London's School of Security Studies the UK Defense Academy and at the Royal College of Defense Studies educating senior strategic leaders and officers from around the world dr is the author of a number of uh fascinating books on geopolitics and strategy the most recent of which is Subversion: The Strategic Weaponization of Narratives published 2023 which describes how state and non-state actors use information warfare in the form of weaponized narratives to destabilize their opponents societies today we'll be talking to Dr about British foreign policy particularly in the Middle East but we'll also be zooming out to examine the scope for Britain to pursue a more independent foreign policy in an increasingly multipolar world dr creed thank you so much for joining us today thanks for having me to begin with let's set some historical context so Britain um pro its influence in the region probably started waning after the sewers crisis in 56 um and by 1971 you see pretty much a full withdrawal of all UK military presence in the region so given that historical context how much uh influence does the UK still carry in the region today and to what extent is it seen as independent rather than just an extended arm of US power good question so I think we need to differentiate between power and influence i think um in terms of power you're absolutely right sewers and we see the withdrawal east of sewers that started in the 1970s that kind of led to the creation of many of the GCC countries as well was certainly a reduction massive reduction of U of UK power British power um especially about um I think what the UK has which probably no other country no external country has in the way that the UK has it is influence the sort of strategic depth in terms of relationships the networks that the UK can draw on and also the way the power of attraction because a lot of Middle Easterners are still looking towards the UK and Britain as a sort of um mediating power not as radical as the United States on some positions not as driven by interest as the United States certainly not with a sort of hegemonial um ambition like the United States um while at the same time understanding the Middle East much better than let's say countries like China or Russia and so um and obviously London in itself is kind of the capital outside of their own capital right for a lot of Gulf states in particular they still have not only diaspora here but come here they have their houses here they you know UK has a lot of power of attraction in terms of the networks and I think that that kind of puts the UK on a very interesting footing when compared to the United States because the United States over the last let's say US power in the Middle East really only started after the Second World War uh and it was mostly based on transactions right was oil was about coercion was about military power it wasn't really about influence and I think the Americans still haven't developed the sort of understanding of the region because they usually came with even when it wasn't officially America first it was always an approach that was putting America first in the in the way of saying we're the you know great white city on the on the hill uh we're kind of the beacon of liberalism and we're kind of we've got something to to bring to you and I think that's kind of what the where the British were in colonial times a 100 years ago um and so the US engagement in the Middle East always feels a little bit more neoconial right um and the UK post SUS certainly post 1970 doesn't feel like a colonial power anymore i think for most Middle Easterners the UK the the UK doesn't feel like a threat but a partner um with great relationships the only issue is that most of the networks are privately held they're not held by government um and government itself I think since the 1970s hasn't really formulated a strategy in any way i don't think you know if we were if we were looking at UK strategy and policy I don't think we would be able to really define anything tangible in terms of what does the UK actually want and as you already mentioned I think for the most part we're piggy banking along the United States in terms of um how we deliver phrase frame our policy and worst of all in many in many instances where the UK has a very unique position giving you give you rather looking at Yemen for example right right so in Yemen the UK has relationships with all the different parties on the ground very interesting Aiden yeah um in yeah given Aiden obviously but even beyond that I mean the many Yemenes still see the UK as more of a uh an understanding power in comparison to the to the US problem here was so we've built we invested for nearly a decade into the reconciliation process certainly wasn't going very well but at least you know we we're we're getting somewhere and there isn't an alternative to political consolidation then the Houthies start attacking Israel after the 7th of October and the UK instead of following their policy through of saying let's get everyone around the table just overnight said okay we need to support the United States which is a militaryonly approach which is not going anywhere and so that's kind of the UK many ways the government is hamstrung by the special relationship with the United States I think what the UK has to do is kind of find their own independent policy to work on top of the already existing networks that's fascinating I guess a question I have is so you've described uh you've you've distinguished between power and influence uh categorizing power mostly is predicated on uh transactional value on finance on military might and influence as uh comprising these sort of soft relationships and networks that have been developed over many many years uh and you've also talked about how you know the UK government hasn't really had a cogent strategy with which to leverage this have there ever been any examples in you know well have there been any examples that are salient and relevant to the last 20 years where uh it feels like um these networks have in fact been leveraged to broker deals to mediate agreements to find peace of some kind uh in the Middle East more broadly i think they're being these kind of networks been used all the time i mean especially diaspora networks i mean Yemen is a great example a lot of the Yemeni diaspora and all you know all the divisions taking all the division divisions in Yemen into account most of the different parties of Yemen have some sort of relationship to the UK so the UK government is quite easy to draw on these different relationships so the UK has it much easier than France Germany and even the United States to draw on people in the end of the day conflicts and uh and stability is a people-to-people sort of exercise so you need to have the sort of relationship to these individuals and as you know in the Middle East individuals are more important than institutions so a personal relationship is always more important than having an institutional relationship so it does work in in on on various fronts in Libya as well i mean there are certain personal relationships that were drawn upon the problem always is the UK doesn't know what it wants from itself you know it's it's a country in an identity crisis in general domestically but also externally it's like we haven't gotten to terms with the fact that we're no longer a great power we don't know if we're yet a middle power and what it means to be a middle power how do we set ourselves apart from our European partners obviously Brexit this narrative that we have of global Britain is a great narrative but it's lacks a complete underbody of in terms of the uh the the means and ways that we're going to use to achieve whatever global Britain is so I can't really point to any particular example where I think okay that's where the UK draws on the point right yeah so you talked about the extent to which um British foreign policy can be hamstrung by our special relationship with the Americans um as an institution Pickthor is very strongly in favor of British foreign policy independence how would you categorize u or how would you summarize Britain's strategic interest in the region and where do you think they come into conflict with with the Americans so key strategic interest for the for the UK which is you know prosperity for the UK but also prosperity for the region stability because obviously prosperity is stability connected and then from stability comes security for us here i mean obviously terrorism is still a concern in the back of our mind in terms of having an influx of people from the region that have affiliation with violent non-state act is certainly is a concern even if it is not as pressing as it was after 9/11 um but also security for people on the ground in the Middle East I think is is another one so we do we would like to I think what is great is that we have withdrawn from the idea that we were probably you know the impression that we were under in the early 2000s under you know Tony Blair the idea that you know we need to democratize right let's bring liberalism to the Middle East I think engage in this Fukuyan state building exercise yeah exactly a state building as as well I mean we're a lot less hands-on and it has to do as well with the fact that grant strategically the United States has changed their approach to the Middle East as well in terms of being less hands-on on being let's saying live and at live delegating policy to local actors especially the Gulf countries and the UK follows the same sort of approach i think there's a realization now that the Gulf as the only stable sort of um part of the region financially stable and also in terms of security um is the is a partner that we need to work through and alongside with because we don't have the strategic depth the same is true for the United States they don't have the strategic depth to do it themselves they need the bidding of uh of the Gulf States to help them out on this and the UK is following the same line the only difference is that the Gulf States for the most part still have a stronger um affectionate sort of relationship with the UK than they have with the United States and it's also the sort of legacy goes a long way where there the legacy with the United States very superficial so um the United the United Kingdom has an opportunity here to secure relationship with the Gulf because the Gulf likes Britain is as simple as that there is an appeal um the other thing is though what can the UK offer the Gulf which is the other question is so you you're taking something you want to work through them you want you want countries like Kata to mediate in in Gaza you want Oman to mediate with the Iranians you want the countries mediate with the Iranians you kind of want the Saudis to potentially mediate between Ukraine and and Russia um in Syria as well we don't really have a policy on Syria we don't really know where things are going but we kind of want the Gulf States to make sure that they a pay for reconstruction and b help with governance but at the same time we don't really set the framework for it so we you know we want to have the cake and eat it at the most time right we we want to dictate the terms and we want the Gulf States to follow in our interest and based on our values in the way that they implement policy which is something that we cannot expect and I think that's something that MBZ wabinite was said when he was crime pres at some point in in a meeting um where he was saying you know you can't expect us and I think it was to a British or an American diplomat saying you can't expect us to do your heavy lifting in the region on your behalf and doing this within the same parameters of your policy your interest your values right if we do we're doing it based on the way we want to do it yeah and that's probably true for all the Gulf states um some are more lenient towards the west than others the UAE is not one that is it's on most most accounts not very lenient to the west um they've got their own sort of um approach then you've got Oman and Qatar I think who are more lenient towards the west trying to keep the west happy on all occasion then you got Saudi somewhere in the middle um point being is if we don't know what we want we can't really ask our partners in the Gulf to do whatever we want them to do because they will do it because they they feel they're filling a vacuum they feel no sense of obligation to you as a result of your Exactly yeah and I think the UK has convening power here to kind of lead on some of it and that is not based on effective coercive power but the convening power that the UK has on issues like Yemen even on issues on Palestine I think on Palestine because of the legacy of Palestine being a British protectorate um the fact that Israel came out of a British protectorate and you know the Bour declaration uh you know that was these were all British policy um policies at the time this means that we have a responsibility and we but we also have a legacy in terms of having those relationships on the ground and Arabs on the ground are looking to to the UK as a country that should sort this stuff out and we have an opportunity to do that on Palestine on on Yemen on uh on the on the Gulf more widely i mean everywhere where the UK once had a footprint we can do something about it but we're refusing to take the lead on this because we think that we you know we we let the Americans follow sorry let them lead and we follow and that's an overall overarching issue that we've had in Europe is that let's let the Americans do the first step and we kind of follow behind and now with Donald Trump we're in a situation where we cannot let them lead we and and we we can't just follow we need to kind of design our own policies and I see with Donald Trump you know the infringement on international law and and so on means that we cannot just follow his sometimes crazy ideas of creating the Middle East Riviera for example we have to push back and there's another point that I would make the UK has to be um as it not just as a convening power but also has to be an arbiter in terms of we stand up for the rule of law right we you know that's where Britain has always last couple of centuries been very strong of saying we stand up based on the rule of law we we we stick to norms and values um and at least norms and and laws maybe not necessarily values um and if we do so we have to be very consistent you know when we decry Russian aggression in Ukraine we also have to decry uh Israeli aggression in in in Palestine And we have an opportunity to do that but we we don't we don't want to because we constantly feel like if we do that even if we were to recognize Palestine like other European countries do we feel like we would alienate the special relationship yeah exactly alienate the Americans we have to choose of what what it is that we want to be and who we want to be right that's super interesting so you mentioned that we can't let the Americans lead and simply be a follower um but given that you've also mentioned that we we don't have that coercive hard power to back up um you know what we're saying publicly um either we we kind of have to defer to the Americans or we have to build other partnerships that that are underscored with that you know ultimate military mind um so so how do we balance those i think military mind only gets you that far in the Middle East anyway at the moment look at the America has assembled the greatest military force in human history by by by all accounts in terms of people under arms the money spent on it global projection militaryes spending look at look at all the conflicts that we're facing in the Middle East from Syria over Palestine Yemen and the conflict with Iran there isn't a military solution to any of them the military power America has is not getting them that far or Afghanistan I was going to say oh you could mention Afghanistan as well exactly that's clearly a strategic an operational defeat for all of us in the West collectively and you know I'm not blaming anyone for this you know I understand why we went into Afghanistan at the time but we haven't really built anything and it's because we don't really And now what we see under Trump and the UK seems to follow is uh we're cutting back on development spending right which is very counterintuitive in this kind of context because we're saying we need to fight Russia and it has to be only military um but we need to we need to retain a spectrum of capabilities um and that's not just the military is one I would say small part of that capability if you look at the actual levers of influence we said initially UK UK versus the Middle East is about influence not about power not about coercion um the levers of influence are our financial sector right the inter the entanglement the UK has with local financial authorities and financial networks the information networks is all these people who reside in the UK whoever you know whether they're Muslim or of Arab descent or whatever um the diasporas who live here second third generation who are British but are also Arab or are Muslim have a a very very power you they have mobilization power and how do we draw on that how do we draw on these diasporas um then we have you know got the insurance industry very interesting example if I could throw that in here is if you look at the Babal Manda problem around Yemen right is a shipping issue um none of the governments none of the states have a solution for this we're bombing the Houthis to with no strategic endgame in mind we don't know how are we going to build stability we're just like oh we're going to coers if we punish the what they're doing um and they they keep on firing and they will keep on firing until you kill the very last Houthi right so what we should invest in is is some sort of social political settlement for Yemen if governments can't do this there is certainly the private sector in the UK as a very very much an interest right most of our trade goes through the Babal Mandanda we want this to be open again we don't want ships that go around go around the the Cape Cape Good Hope we want them to go through um Swiss Canal how we can do this i mean if you look at Lloyds of London for example is a you know the biggest underwriter for shipping companies in the world they have a vested interest in making sure this happens many shipping companies are registered in the UK international Maritime Organization is based in the UK how are we making use of what we have right outside Westminster how does government make use of these networks that we have in order to kind of bring about the solution that's it's it's what we call a whole of nation approach and I think that's where we're going in the 21st century whole of network uh sorry whole of network hall of nation uh where we're stuck in terms of strategy making is a whole of government approach we're always thinking about oh yeah we need to have u bring all the different ministries together but you know they are so out of their depth right they've been the civil service uh the military itself they're so preoccupied with other issues they don't have the capacity to deal with these issues so um I think what what needs to happen from the UK point of view is using be aware of everything that you have at your available financial networks insurance networks information networks tech networks i mean this is is another thing right and research output anything that academia what a great example right I mean one of the greatest levers of power the UK has and influence is academia yeah yeah completely outside is to given it completely and they're building relationships with local research centers where these relationships exist but then many times universities or governments say I'm not too comfortable with having a relationship with a Saudi entity or with a katri entity or an amirati entity um where we sometimes have to think okay what do we get out of it so I call this Talk about networkcentric stake corrupt this is what I call weaponized interdependence right right the UK is one of the London in particular is one of the most interdependent places in the world based on people based on ideas flows of capital labor you name it most connected place in the world how do we use that connectivity as an asset to growth grow our influence that's so interesting i guess a question I have is if it is I suppose like um something that's slightly puzzling right is it if if it is in fact the case that it is in Shell's interest BP's interest you know Lloyds of London the IMO as in the International Maritime Organization uh if it's in their interest uh to use um tools in their arsenal uh to try and mediate in uh Yemen to try and clear up shipping lanes uh and if in fact there are these like large institutions that have the ability to lobby government that discourse constantly with government how come we haven't seen this already take place well a lot of conversations are taking place obviously not in a as do you feel like there are strategic blockers somewhere in government that preclude them from allowing uh people to pursue their own interests in a way that would be most conducive to a solution that is not in fact military that doesn't result in us just bombing the Houthis into into oblivion to no end no I think the interesting what we have to understand is Westminster Whiteall is like a castle right with very tall castle walls whatever happens behind the walls stays somewhat uh in shaded in secrecy if you will mhm what they haven't done is really building networks in and out and when they do build networks like intelligence services they built them in one direction right to gather information but there are valves in between that make sure that make sure that the networks are not reciprocal it's unidirectional i see so what you need to do is build reciprocal relationships right and so let's take the case of Lloyds of London there is there is one country that can really unlock Yemen and that's Oman right the Omanis have the relationship with the Houthis they have a relationship with different parties on the on the ground saudis have a vested interest as well our government is not going to do anything really um when I say government civil service or the military to really use these relationships effectively to drive anything forward because again we're hamstrung with our relationship with the United States and we never really strategic because governments because of the way the system works most of the system isn't very strategic it takes short-term over long-term decisions and so political gain is more important than actually national gain long-term blah blah blah now if you have private corporations that have an interest they don't they it's very difficult for a private entity to actually get access to that castle that I was talking about right right and draw upon the relationships which are international relations let's say Oman Oman as an as a somewhat a potential partner to unlock that relationship with the Hoodies why can a private entity not have an have access with Oman to unlock that relationship if our government is not doing anything about it and so what we need to do is kind of develop a public private partnership along the way where there is cross polariz polarization and but also interdependence right both going both ways where both sides can work with one another and that's not happening and so there are certain blockers in the way whereby government says oh no that's a matter of national security we can't possibly talk about it oh I see and most of the time when you have conversation with people on a level where you say that's about national security you realize that there is actually a lot of people in the private sector who have these relationships already who do business or via interlocators with that particular entity and they're not don't have any security clearance and they do have the conversation without security clearance and they have more effect on the ground than those guys who who work in their little ivory tower of saying oh this is too much top secret can't possibly talk about it um so in in the work in the in the world of entanglement that we're in hyperconivity these old structures these hierarchical structures right of state um are are very ills suited to work alongside those networks it's funny because this reminds me very much of you know the conversation we briefly touched on earlier about uh the East India trading company being so extraordinarily effective in India and how uh the UK in contrast with uh you know drawing on our own history uh in contrast with France or Spain or Germany uh managed to project so much power so internationally for quite so much time uh with uh you know it was often called a a night watchman empire in so far as it was incredibly decentralized mostly relied on trade commerce and relationships and it's quite interesting to see that uh that now that the world is somehow more interconnected we've sort of given up this strategy and instead adopted a more hierarchical top down centralized approach that hasn't yielded anything no would that be fair to say very much if I can draw upon this because so always hard to make a case for the East India company and I'm not making very you know I'm very adant it's a question of capa capability right not morality but let's think from a British point of view let's look at the British crown in the 17th century or 16th century actually uh tuda late TUDA times sure right Um it was a small island nation on the periphery of Europe um usually in comparison to France and Spain certainly not as as wealthy mostly agricultural mostly the only export was really wool compared to the big empires of the time even the Spanish one or or China or you know or Morgul India y it wasn't even a power at all it was a small state on the periphery completely meaningless um Elizabeth the first in in the late Tudtor period was thinking about okay we we have no capacity we have no capacity to build our own army we have no capacity to build our own navy we have no capacity to um to build the kind of levers of statecraft which are required for us to actually compete with Spain Portugal and the other countries that are already out there so they said let's let's enable the private sector to do that for us kind of following the Dutch model dutch same thing small state small republic they said okay very decentralized let's use the market and that's what TUDA what the elabian age was all about is about empowering the market the East India Company found in 1600 was kind of the sort of the pinnacle of that development of saying let the private sector deal with this let's go out discover trade routes uh empowering giving a charter a monopoly to a company to say you build that relationship you have the you you you raise the capital which is also you know you go to the market you raise the capital to build a fleet uh have that fleet raise capital to pay for people to go on work on the ships and then go out there everything was entirely privatized at at the peak The East India Company had a 200,000 people under arms which were which were far you know far more powerful than anything that the British crown or the English crown had uh at their disposal so it it was a a massive empire uh based built around a state it was a corporate empire if you it was one of the first corporate empires so I'm not saying we should emulate this the problem is once it ceased to be be a network of traders and a network of different trading outpost networks that included obviously Indian interlocators and Chinese interlocators and so on once it ceased to be a network and became a more and more a centralized hierarchy which was the case in the early 19th century to mid- 19th century it became a governing entity that became autocratic authoritarian repressive exploitative blah blah blah blah blah and that's when it failed actually and that's when it became empire that's when it actually failed but the idea here is what can we learn from how we use the market and private networks to create connectivity because that's what all the East India Company did for the most of the first hundred years in the throughout the 1600s yeah broker relationships and broker relationship capital generate capital bring it back to London um and create for the most part win-win relationships and um and that's what weaponized interdependence is interdependence has to have a degree of win-win right it's not a zero- sum game and I think that's where Britain is very strong win-win rather than zero sum precisely and so and so it's a question of us recognizing u the way in which we've done things in the past success successfully uh and how we can uh undertake this again how can we learn not necessarily replicate it but how can we learn from the lessons from the past because we have a way collectively not just in the UK but our western world view that we have then also exported to the rest of the world is saying the best way to do statecraftraft and governance and organizing that is a hierarchical system of you know top- down management where there is control where there is uh where there is a stratification of based on rank or you know seniority bureaucracy and some class exactly how can we look into you know in Google if you look at Google for example they've embraced a network uh sort of model in itself and the way they organize their companies many big corporations have embraced the network model the state hasn't the state is still as hierarchical as it was in the 19th century and so that hierarchy which I would probably say came about in the 18th 19th century and became sort of the gold standard for how we do state craft and governance is coming I'm not saying coming to an end but it's it certainly has matched has kind of reached the limits of what it can achieve and so if we want to survive if states want to survive in thisworked world in which we're in where flows matter then you have to embrace the network uh model in itself and it's not a zero sum it's not like you either become a network or you're a hierarchy you can be both you know successful network states like the UAE for example or Iran um have a core which is extremely hierarchical but a periphery which is veryworked and diffused and spread out yeah exactly and that's how they generate power and that's why the UAE is a fairly small state in many ways you could say the UAE has replicated the the the the model of of of Tudtor England of a small state with a large with a hierarchical core and basically decentralizing and externalizing statecraft throughout that massive network and that's how they have generated the sort of influence and power that makes them I would say arguably the most powerful country in the Middle East so bring it back to the Middle East on on that note i I mean the the network stuff is fascinating we'll probably bring it back in that direction we'll circle in that direction later um we wanted to talk to you about um the war in Gaza at the moment um and Britain's role um and Britain's response to it so um we've seen pretty much since October 2023 um a lot of kind of humming and eyeing and reluctance from Britain to to really take a a concrete position on um on the war so in the early days for example you had um huge hesitation to publicly declare what the legal opinion um was was uh regarding export licenses um then as the fighting intensified um there have been fairly credible reports of war crimes committed by Israel which um which the UK has again failed to acknowledge um I suppose this comes back to some extent to our conversation about um uh the special relationship and and following the US position um but how how does how does the UK retain credibility and retain its its uh position as as an upholder of the rules order if we fail to do these things very very difficult i think Palestine is a Palestine in many ways and obviously I don't think this is going to go away wherever direction this conflict is going whether you know hopefully this ceasefire that we currently have will be extended but it doesn't look very good doesn't look very promising wherever this conflict is going to go Palestine is is going has been elevated since the 7th of October to a level across the world across the western world our world um that I think it hasn't been elevated to that level since the the lastifada so in the last years or so um Palestine has been somewhat in the back of the mind if if at all of most people most people thought that Palestinian cause was dead so it's now been elevated to such a big issue that you know who whatever position you take as a government on this issue it will define your credibility your legitimacy for a very broad audience uh and funny enough you know I I'm someone who's lived 20 years on and off throughout the Middle East including in Israel but also on the other side everyone has an everyone has an opinion on this conflict everyone seems to be mobilized everyone seems to think they know what the solution is to this problem um and if the UK government takes a position or doesn't take a position on something like something as important as the Palestinian conflict it will have ripple effects um for what we're trying to do in other theaters right so whatever we do in Palestine will have an impact on our relationship with the Gulf it will have an impact on the relationship with the global south because across the Commonwealth there's been somewhat a consensus across the global south in particular of where you know where we should stand where everyone should stand on on not b not based on pro Israel pro Palestine but just based on you know human humanitarian law international humanitarian law international law based on principles and as you said a rules-based sort of system and based on it should everyone should have a principled position the UK was always big on principled positions and we're not and so I think the damage of trying to have that we have that cognitive dissonance you know when I interact with you know whether it's MPs or civil servants who work on the matter who would seem to be thinking yeah well I understand it's quite problematic what Israel is doing but and there adopt these kind of husbar narratives the narratives that the Israelis are injecting into our discourse to kind of uh defend the inde indefensible um then there is some sort of cognitive dissonance where a lot of people are saying yeah I understand it's very bad what the Israelis are doing but you need to also understand x y and zed and I get um on on some issues certainly there are some caveats but when you're killing you know uh 60,000 civilians there is no caveat in in such a short amount of time there isn't really a caveat for that and the way it was done I mean we've got so much evidence mounting evidence of individual cases of of war crimes being committed you know which warrant an investigation the fact the UK government has stopped issuing licenses for exports which could be used for offensive action is a symptom or is a result of them realizing that actually we could be in very muddy sort of legal waters if we continue to do so because there is credible evidence even the government lawyers saying that that the U the UK the that Israel is committing war crimes on a large scale and here's the difference to because then when Israelis come back and say oh look what you did in Anbar in 2006 look what you did fighting ISIS in Mosul la look what you did in in Afghanistan and yes there have been individual cases of war crimes being committed and um and you know there There is a lot of anecdotal evidence for that but it's never been as systematic as it has been in Gaza since the 7th of October yeah or state sanctioned yeah and it's state sanctioned it comes from the top and as you've got and the reason why the ICC is looking into this and why there is a case at the international criminal court uh sorry at the inter international court of justice as well as the ICJ is that you have an you you have leaders in government leaders across the chain of command of the military embracing particular positions which are very much not you know in keeping with the way that we've defined international humanitarian law and there has been a concerted effort to rewrite international humanitarian or in the in in in the in the conduct of of that war but the Israelites are saying we need to push the boundaries of this of what is acceptable behavior because this is such an outrageous what happened on the 7th of Octo is so outrageous that we need to rethink warfare altogether um and um you know the UK should take a principal position on that and saying we absolutely agree that Israel has a right to defend itself um you know based on principle right you have a right to get your hostages back absolutely but you in in the course of that you can't just say every civilian or every Palestinian is a legitimate target this this echoes a lot of PFLaus's own thinking on the fact that Britain in fact used to have a relatively independent and more balanced moderate view uh on Israel even even his latest Thatcher you know her importing her imposing arms embargos on Israel uh multiple times not just once um and somehow over the course of the last uh 30 years uh again like um in keeping with the general theme of the UK seeding uh all forms of foreign policy sovereignty and you can maybe point at Blair or maybe you know Iraq as the the watershed moment it feels now like um any any any independence of any sort has completely been abnigated much to our detriment the Americans will pursue their own interests u and in a in a twisted sort of sense we're u also pursuing their interests yeah but I think it's not about the Americans i think the watershed moment isn't anything the UK has done i think Israeli pro-Israel networks of information networks spreading certain narratives um across a wide spectrum so these are not your just your your NOS's and activists but it's people who are lobbying MPs people who you know work with civil servants people who uh you know across the spectrum of civil society are engaging in injecting what the Israelis call which is like you know their sort of propaganda narratives this is normalized um so this includes Apac and the conservative friends of Israel and the but that's just the tip of the iceberg i think the civil societal element is a lot more dangerous um and it's the coercive part of this as well so there's a consens consensus part where the Israelis are trying to shift consensus on the matter they failed and I think we've seen in this war in Gaza that a lot of the narratives that might have been more palatable during previous Gaza operations are no longer pal palatable to to the vast amount of people in the public including conservatives including people who are generally friends of Israel uh it makes it very difficult to take a position so they went from consensus building to coercion so you know you you have that uh that sort of uh um approach of of framing people as anti-semites you know using legal action as well you know there is now a network of lawyers who will take up claims against individuals so there's a lot of intimidation um so you're being ostracized from academia from journalism people be put under pressure I mean a lot of BBC journalists being put under pressure where the BBC has to apologize what it leads to is a it's an interference in the information environment it's an interference so harsh and so coercive that it leads to compulsion as well where a lot of others who might have not been in the firing line saying actually is it worth it for me to actually document and and and adequately report on this issue because I might face this massive backlash and we've seen that over the last couple of weeks um over the BBC documentary in Gaza and the amount of controversy that was uh thrown at it which was you know it's a it's a minority opinion that this was controversial um and it has certainly has a legitimate this piece whatever ever you make of it has a legitimate uh sort of claim and it's a legitimate piece to show considering that we haven't done enough to humanize the suffering of the victims in Gaza we've done quite a lot to humanize and rightly so the victimization of Israelis who who suffered on the 7th of October indeed um but we need to have a balance right we're not the BBC isn't the BB broadcasting corporation right it's the British broadcasting operation and as the UK we you know we have no vested interest in this conflict we should again take a position based on a positive neutrality and based on principle y as all people are asking for i mean in in particular the controversy around this documentary is peculiar because we wouldn't need Palestinian sources to be delivering news to us if we we were allowed to send it into into Gaza um so coming back to the idea of principle around um the conflict and Britain's interests our official position has been to support a two-state solution based on 67 borders since the 7th of October that prospect seems increasingly unlikely to happen gaza has been demolished um if we did have a Palestinian state which included Gaza it would need to be rebuilt there would need to be some kind of marshall plan for Gaza but beyond that um we've seen since Assad fled Syria Israel carried out bombings in Syria they captured territory beyond the Golan Heights and southern southern Syria now as well um so there'd be a lot more unwinding to do if we were to try and implement two-state solution at this stage um than you know in the Oslo years so to what extent do you think a two-state solution is still viable it's not viable as it stands at the moment uh it is what I believe in is a Palestinian state solution uh right let's not call it two states whatever this whatever whatever needs to be created as a state for the Palestinians whether this is you know in what format format I don't know but if you say you know if we wed ourselves too much to a solution that is that was like you said was very much viable in the '90s nearly 30 years ago um um and it's not now then we have to reconsider how we going to frame the Palestinian state solution but the thing is also if you look look at the trajectory of where the conflict is going there's not going to be an Israel ex that lives in peace in stability in security and prosperously if they don't concede to the Palestinians to have a right of self-determination that is just not Israel will not survive this and I'm not saying the next 10 years but if you just look at the trajectory of where Israel is going the internal what we've seen for the most part is that the what happens after the 7th of October the polarization over you know fighting back and we you know we have to we need vengeance and we need to get our hostages back has completely um glossed over the internal divisions in the country yeah right um on top of that there are intracommunal violence within Israel there are two million I think nearly 2 million Israelis who are not Jewish um who become gradually secondass citizens then you've got people in the West Bank that we haven't really looked upon who are also now over the last couple weeks have been subjected to equal treatment like the Gazins um then you've got the call for ethnic cleansing of of of Gaza which is just not as a plan not feasible even if you leave the norms and and and ethics aside logistics logistics logistically 2.2 million people cannot be put on planes and flown to Jordan and Egypt and whatnot and certainly not so voluntarily there are not 2.2 million Gazas who want to leave voluntarily yeah so you need to come up with a solution that is actually viable a strategy none none of this is strategic israel is we always think of Israel as such a strategic player israel is not strategic it's always operational it's finding operational solution solutions to strategic problems it never has kind of laid out a a viable road map to a political solution to the to to the Palestinian issue or the Palestinian cause um and obviously now we have farright fundamentalists in in power in in Israel who are less likely to even embrace that um and and will do everything they can to make sure that this is not a viable solution and it's again up to the international community to make sure that there are red lines that are being crossed at the moment anyway that in terms of war crimes ethnic cleansing is another red line which is also going on in in in the West Bank these are red lines that are being crossed and the government here in the UK has been half-hearted in condemning that um and saying oh this might not be the best way forward um you know trying to find balanced words because we don't want to antagonize the Israelis or the United States in that matter but I would even say the United States under Trump is less of a Zionist than his predecessor Biden is he's far less ideologically wedded to the idea of Israel he's doing it because it serves its constituency um and certainly people within his direct agreement you know these sort of zealots these kind of you know Zionist and and Christian fundamentalist they certainly have a very strong ideological um commitment commitment to Israel um but he himself isn't he's very pragmatic he just wants these issues to to stop and he doesn't want US taxpayers money or US boots on the ground to kind of solve the ripple effects of that issue so I think there is an opportunity also to bring Trump in on on this and I think that's where the Gulf States come in to kind of say "Okay Trump you want investments from the Gulf you want us to help you out with reconstruction happy to do so but you need to also make certain that's kind of the Saudi approach we also want you to make progress on the two-state solution in whatever format format that will that will happen." That's super fascinating i mean in particular the the the point about how uh this is not even strategically in Israel's interest it cannot possibly be the case that it antagonizes uh so many uh people in in in in a vast uh uh array of nations all around the world and expect to continue to live in peace stability and security going forward as we now see in South Lebanon and and South Syria even now yeah and and just to to expand on that a little bit the the the previous Trump administration they considered one of their great successes to be um the kind of expansion of the Abraham Accords m um it seems that the Abraham courts are completely dead in the water given the current situation as well um in fact we are is it being hosted today there's a there's a um conference in Cairo um hosting Arab Arab countries to discuss the Palestine issue um so how how does how does the Western world interface with with that effort because the Saudis have made it clear that any normalization with with Israel is going to be preconditioned on a resolution of the of the Arai conflict well I think that's very ambitious i think the Saudis would settle for less that's their kind of bargaining position where they say in the same way that Trump is setting out a bargaining position and saying this is what I'm asking for but I might be willing to settle for this the Saudis are saying this is what we need but we can settle for this i think the Saudis they are mostly interested in finding a solution that works for their national interest but also keeps the peace at home because obviously the vast majority of Saudis would not accept a blank check sort of normalization in the way that the Emiratis have done it and so the Abram Accords are not necessarily dead because I think they're delivering for the Emiratis they're an Emirati project they've always been an Emirati project and so the Saudis were never going to exceed to the Abraors would have always had their own deal um because they don't want to be China the junior partner to the Emiratis on all of this um but the Emiratis are the problem with the Emiratis is that they haven't asked for anything in return they just thought "Okay we get access to AI tech and all kinds of Israeli tech cyber security tech um we get um a lot of credit in in in Washington." And I think that's the credit that they're using up at the moment as they're you know as the Amiratis are helping the the Russians to to um bypass sanctions as they're helping the Chinese setting up their sort of intelligence base all issues that are problematic in Western capitals they always can use that sort of get out of jail cart which is the abort of saying but we are the ones who normalize with Israel and so I in a lot of the conversations I'm having also in London with uh you know analysts but also policy makers is whenever we raise issues about the UAE and their UAE's behavior whether it's in Sudan where they where they support the genocide RSF yep there's always that thing of like yeah it's very problematic what the UAE are doing but they do have they remember they're the ones who have a relation with Israel so they I think that was a very strategic move by theatis to get that kind of out of jail card and it is delivering uh and I think it's it's probably more powerful than I even expected when when it was signed initially and that's also certainly a big claim for the Saudis i mean this is a big ambition for the Saudis to get that kind of out of jail card um however um I just don't think that the Saudis will be willing to um uh you know would be willing to to exceed to that um and whether they will say they need something that they can sell as a commitment to the Palestinians unlike the Emiratis but to have a narrative of saying we do something in the interest of the of the Palestinians is not the same as actually doing something viable so I think there is some flexibility on the Saudi side you can we can talk about like uh whether or not the UK u should concern itself more with uh the European stances and start using that as a template model to break away from American European what is a European stance sort of like uh you know some countries in Europe like France and Spain as you mentioned are largely um softer on Israel than than than certainly the states is and then the question becomes whether or not you they're harder in Israel uh sorry they're harder in Israel uh than the states is uh and then the question becomes whether or not uh it is in the UK's interest particularly as the US gets increasingly isolationist to start moving uh or trying to forge closer alliances with Europe on foreign policy issues after all you know given uh the fact that the UK shares uh suffers similarly as Europe does from refugee crisis has similar worries about Russia as Europe does unlike the states you know as Trump quotes you know we have this big beautiful ocean in between us would it not be in Britain's best interest to start aligning itself more closely with Europe at least on foreign policy issues i mean Europe in itself I we talk with the European Union they're bra you know what Macron said they're brain dead when it comes to anything whether it's their own security policy or foreign own foreign and security policy when it comes to the Middle East and the Middle East is you know there there are key also from the UK's point of view key neighborhood that we need to be concerned about whether it's for migration or energy so on it's a priority unlike for the Americans who have for them it's it's one of many crises but it is far away for us it's not far away and any ripple effect of any conflict in this part of the world will have direct impact on on on our national security so we we don't really have a choice but I would equally say the Europeans don't offer anything that we could cling on to more so I would say that the that many European countries are looking to the UK to lead but I think what again going back to the UK as a convening power we have the ability to bring certain people around the table yeah um even if we're not member of the European Union you know I've got my own personal bias of why we shouldn't be part of the European Union um and I think it was good i think we have now an opportunity to do something without being sort of uh kind of cornered in in in in a framework that is dominated by Brussels but we're not doing anything with it all right um and despite the fact that we're not part of the EU we should work alongside the EU and other European Union member states on Ukraine and also on the Middle East but neither of them have any sort of strategy that being said the US has no strategy either so that's the whole problem right we've been working walking sort of sleepwalking in a in a strategic vacuum in the Middle East because no one externally really has an agenda or a strategy or an objective and so local forces kind of fill that vacuum as they see fit but we need to be more proactive and I think the Europe could be again goes back to networks let's use what the Europeans have let's offer what we have and get something in something from the Europeans as well because we all face the same issue all the threats and challenges coming from the Middle East from energy to migration to terrorism whatnot are the same throughout Europe more so for Europe than it is for the United States so uh let's let's zoom out a little bit now and talk uh a little bit about the uh international order as it currently stands given uh what some are perceiving as uh increasing isolationism from Trump um uh what do you think that this means for the international rules-based order that has dominated foreign policy discourse since World War II do you think that it's dead in the water do you think that there's any chance for it to be revived do you think that uh the what we're seeing now from America is anomalous or some kind of bargaining position that they're trying to take in order to increase defense spending in Europe trying to trying to make it so that Americans get a better deal uh or do you think that there is genuine lack of interest in in in maintaining uh the unipolar world order as we see I think the media narrative has been very extreme as everything Trump is very extreme what he says media is very extreme in how they interpret what he says y there's a lot of hot air that's been going around i think what we need to focus upon is the US grand strategy which is independent of individual um administrations that what we see is a a very very strong shift from since the Obama years from the United States to kind of disengage from other parts of the world right sort of pulling up the drawbridge of saying what's good for America like the sort of America first um sort of approach is not a Trump idea I think this has been consistent since Obama's withdrawal from Iraq continued by Trump continued by Biden and now we're back to um he's phrasing it in a very radical manner but the fact is the United States are not going to come back to have Europe's back and that doesn't mean they're going to abandon the Europe right they're still part of NATO and they will remain part of NATO but the sort of commitments of saying why we why should we consume why should a lot of our bandwidth be consumed by supporting the Europeans who have their own money who have their own military they have their own networks why why do we always have to take the lead and I think that's a that's a that's a proposition that we we have to respect and I think what uh the Europeans should be doing including the UK is kind of building their own uh capacity to deal with these issues capacity of statecraftraft also I would say we make a mistake of looking at the world order as being entirely US- ccentric it wasn't and I I also we're saying this is a liberal world order i don't think it was ever a liberal world order depending on how you spell liberalism it's certainly from a economic point of view libertarian i mean it's based on free market and and we see some of it um you know being currently undermined by various tariffs and actions taken by the United States and counter counterterrorists by China and so on but after all the players believe in a in an in a in an open market right communism hasn't returned and China isn't standing for communism they are they want to contribute to this order and so it becomes multipolar or even apolar because everyone has a say in it there's a diffusion of power from the great powers to the middle powers to the small powers everyone have their own niches in which they can operate that has an impact on the way that the order looks like but it doesn't mean the order is coming to an end it's just there more people shaping that order at the same time the order is a lot more spontaneous I would say so it's a lot more the the longevity of that order is certainly not what it used to be um so it's not the trajectory is not going to be linear it's going to be very nonlinear and that's fine again it goes back to my idea about order networked order like the market areworked based on microprocesses order comes spontaneously disappears spontaneously equilibriums equilibria of equilibria of of stability come and go they're being constantly renegotiated um and because we don't have a hedgeim and we don't even have a set of few great powers I think this idea of multipolarity in itself is a bit problematic because it it it suggests that there is an igopoly of great powers that shape that order m still very topheavy top down very realist hierarchical when I say it's a lot more decentralized and there is small powers who at time have disproportionate power over the system um there are non-state actors who have disproportionate influence in shaping power over the system um and so that's the new order and the United States and the what the US is doing right now is a reaction to that new order because they feel like we can't we can't really manage the order as we used to uh and so we're we're just withdrawing from it but you you can't really withdraw draw from it because you're entangled anyway right even from the from China we talk about disentanglement decoupling and all that sort of stuff if you look how the networks have on all levels all domains have kind of entangled ourselves with the Russians with the Chinese with everyone else you know entanglement or disentanglement will only go that far and so this is a new order that we're in with a lot of opportunity um I think for middle powers like the UK with a lot of opportunity even for small states with a lot of opportunity to kind of carve out a niche and I think that's what we see also for a lot of non-state actors who have carved out their own niche um to to shape like big corporations have their own niches i mean if you look at Meta you look at X you look at uh you know some of the data company big data companies Amazon they are shapers of that order as well but we never look at it because it's not as sexy than looking at the 190 and that's the issue with our brain right we're always trying to create order where there isn't one we look at 195 member states of the UN and it's like they're the kind of building blocks of that order no that's rubbish i mean if you look at the order in itself it's a it's a completely decentralized multi- or even apolar system of billions of different nodes that all kind of interact that is uh absolutely fascinating i guess the question then becomes um to what extent do you feel like British institutions are well equipped to deal with this in this increasingly diffuse uhworked world order that we're uh finding ourselves in uh to what extent do you feel like they're failing what would you feel are their most glaring failures and uh what do you think are like appropriate uh what what are the sort of optimal parto optimal steps that can be taken to to improve our efficacy and capability in this new system like you talked a little bit about like leveraging the sort of networks that we have here in London uh you know uh and then the question becomes to you know to what extent can this actually feasibly be organized that's a good question so the issue is if you are you know I've worked for 15 years for the UK military and civil service as you know they're part of my my student body basically mh all of them live in hierarchies all of them work in hierarchies all way all of them think in hierarchical ways they haven't even thought about another alternative to the way that they've done things because we've always done it like this and telling someone in the military in particular that ranks doesn't matter anymore uh and that a a major could potentially overwrite a decision made by a brigadier is completely mindboggling um now what we need to do though is I'm not saying we need to get rid of all the hierarchies they certainly have their position to you know hierarchies are very very good at concentrating effort when when you know when in in time of crisis they're very bad when it comes to low-level simmering conflict which is what we see this con constant state of unpiece that we're seeing right constant challenging competition that's most of what we see is competition right it's not hard conflict it's not sharp conflict it's not hot conflict and in that for that part of the low-level simmering conflict we need to have the networks um what the UK needs to do better in order to embrace that network order is kind of develop a a pituitary gland right it's like the smallest sort of gland in our body that kind of controls all the bigger organs y right most people think it we don't really know what it does but it kind of seems to inject hormones into uh and and enzymes into into our body to make other glands do do the big thing um what what we need is this kind of very small hub to connect the networks take place well no it's it's the it's a connector between network activity which is going on anyway and state activity we need to like I said we need to kind of break down some of the castle walls to kind of enable that cross polar polarization what we need is we need a strategic hub to draw on the market to draw on the private sector to draw on civil society to empower them enable them because activity is already taking place and that's where again in the mindset of most civil servants they're like "Oh no we're so important in shaping policy we're the ones who advance national power for the UK which is certainly true but you're doing that also alongside a lot of the networks which are not part of your remit where you don't have any control over um and so uh we need to rethink our doctrine in that way in terms of saying we we can't control some of the networks but we need to we can't really rein them in but at least we can shape them we can influence we can orchestrate some of these networks thereby giving us influence over those networks that we already have um so that that that is one part of it and and what is the most important part of networks is that you have a transformational ideological um endgame in mind you need a very strong narrative what it means of a what it means to be British what Britain stands for and to make sure that these networks work in the national interest we first of all have to define what that national interest is and so for network to to shape networks orchestrate networks you need to have a very very strong narrative and government doesn't have it i mean they don't even have a narrative if you look at all their uh party manifestos over the last couple years it's very much consumed with domestic issues and even then you know how much of it has actually ever been delivered what is the over global Britain was an interesting narrative but was never filled with content but what we need is we need to have a strong sort of reing point where we're saying okay if you're British this is what Britain stands for this is by the way what we used to have in the 16th 17th 18th century kind of most people implicitly knew what it meant to be British and even if you're working for the private sector you were a trader trading in India uh you know you you didn't have the Union Jack on on you or you know any other flag um but you did what you did and you always had sort of the idea of being British and what it means to advance English interest or later British interest in mind what does it actually mean and I think this is a question of identity and we're in an identity crisis as many other western states are you know in a in a multi- you know in a in a multithnic multicultural society what does it mean to be British and I don't see these things to be at all uh you know contradictory i think we are a multithnic multi-ultural society we we're doing actually fairly good job compared to a lot of other nations in the west by by a certain level of tolerance um but certainly in order for this society to continue advancing for these networks to continue advancing also in terms of statecraftraft we need a very strong narrative of what it means to be British i mean you mentioned this identity crisis exists in many different western powers are the Americans doing a better job because they they do have more kind of not open doors but let's say more exchange of information between the private sector and government um I mean you it looks like there's kind of a mercantalist takeover of government happening at the moment with all these kind of tech billionaires being involved in the administration um but and you you could say that let's say MAGA or America first are kind of trit electoral slogans but they do have some sort of rallying power behind do you think they're doing a better job of what you're describing what's interesting is that Trump has been very coercive actually so the market is you know if you look at the big tech what what was fascinating during his inauguration is that most of the tech guys were sitting behind him as he was uh you know I mean that's I think that's a a no statement big statement as well and it's they were coerced into that i mean the fact that Zuckerbot said "I'm going to let go of some of our policies and we're trying to you know not interfere with government." Seems like they were reign they were reigned in and and and but the thing is I think Trump needs to understand that there are limits to its power because he needs them more than they need him right um and they have extreme leverage what the Americans are doing very well is that the market in itself is extremely free flowing it's very much hyper capitalized which you know obviously we're in comparison we can't compare um right they have they're a hub in tech they're a hub in finance and the mobilization power of that capital goes a long way and but that doesn't mean we can't emulate some of that as we draw on the private sector the problem with the Americans that that they don't have that we have is the fact that every four years or at least every eight years they have a transformational uh sort of shift of power which usually in the last couple of decades always led to 180 degrees shift of policy I think we have despite the fact that we have a two party system number one that we are a monarchy which means the crown in itself is a sort of and I think it's a very very valuable uh element of of stability in this in this country is that we have a force we have a power a legacy that is bigger than day-to-day politics that stands above politics that is a unit rallying force um they don't have that in the United States that connects you to tradition and gives sense of continuity longevity as well we don't Americans don't have And it's very difficult for businesses as well as for uh for these sort of networks to align themselves because every four years every eight years there's a massive shift and you know what we've seen now from I mean Biden to Trump now was a massive shift but what Trump can't run again what we don't know what's going to happen then and so as you have these policy shifts it's very difficult to kind of have a co cohesive direction what it means to be American as well I think is being watered down as well this idea from dishwasher to a millionaire the American dream is no longer what it once was i mean Trump wants to go back to the American dream uh but he hasn't really filled it with content either so you know it's what it means to be American and you know when you speak to Americans who come to the UK a lot of them are trying to leave a lot of highly educated are trying to leave the the US behind because of the toxicity and they're saying okay the next best thing for us is coming to the UK and it's also because despite all the polarization we have in our country is we have we have more of that stability going on that they don't have i guess um coming back to the idea of uh you know network ccentric statecraft um something that is very interesting is the idea of uh leveraging these networks in such way that small powers can punch far above their weight and the salient example that we sort of touched on a couple of times in this conversation is uh the UAE uh I guess I'm quite curious to figure out you know I mean they've been called a master of warfare by delegation yeah building networks of local proxies private military contractors allied militias to project influence across the Middle East and Africa and also in cyerspace which is pretty interesting uh I guess how how would you make sense of this like how does this actually work and to what end well the end is UAE national interest Emirati Abu Dhabi national interest so it used to be a a a country of seven emirates right it is to be a federation where mo most of them were somewhat equal um but was supposed to be a rotation of power what we've seen over the last 15 years or so is a centralization of power in Abu Dhabi at the expense of the other six emirates particularly at the expense of Dubai um and that centralization of power in the hands of the al- Nahan which is the ruling family of Abu Dhabi was very much translated into statecraftraft as well where Abu Dhabi is controlling all these networks as well they don't only control governance but they also control the agenda for the UAE and so when we talk about Emirati interest they're primarily Abu Dhabi interest and then secondarily they might be more widely more broadly interest um the UAE has been and you you mentioned violent non-state actors yes the UAE is an absolute great convening power for violent onstate actors they've been creating their own sort of axis of resistance um you know as the as the Iranians have they've have a massive network of violent onstead actors whether it's you know from the LNA in Libya to the RSF in Sudan to the STC affiliated groups in in Yemen um group then obviously backing Vagnner group and financing Vartner group across Africa across no across Africa I mean so Vagnner group would not be operational on the African continent if it wasn't for the infrastructure they're using in the UAE for money laundering for gold laundering for using private logistics companies to fly mercenaries in and Um and so the UAE have developed these massive the massive hub of networks that they can offer to anyone um and that kind of creates them has established them as a hub a global hub for finance a global hub in information technology i mean we talk about AI and and crypto and and cyber power uh they have they're a power in these kind of security networks or violent onset actors uh logistics networks what else other you know tech networks whatever network you can find the UAE have developed into a a regional hub and then in some cases also an international global hub with a strong centralized very diffuse periphery as you say yeah and with high connectivity to Asia to Africa to other places of the world great energy networks as well again all kind of coming together in the UAE for a country of a million people a million citizens that's quite remarkable it is quite remarkable would you would you parallelize this with with the way uh Israel projects power around the world quite interesting so in my upcoming book which I call webs of power I'm I'm have one chapter on small states and how they can use networks effectively i compare the UAE uh with uh with Israel and Israel has a lot of the network power as well yeah indeed and in size actually Israel and the UAE are quite similar in terms of their GDP and even in terms of their overall population the Israelis use different networks they're obviously leader in tech networks i think that the tech sector is you know the sort of the idea of a startup nation it's quite remarkable how a small state like this with that innovation power has created connectivity across the globe and interdependence whereby Israel that Israel can use and weaponize in order to have influence uh in tech sectors and you know data flows all over the world um the UAE has that too but the UAE is more diversified then you can make a case that Israel has these information networks that we talked about before where they can influence and shape discourse also globally oriented sort of battle of narratives in the in the battle of narratives but you know that that is it's still not as doesn't go as far as as what the UAE have because the UAE have a capacity issue of being a one a country of 1 million trying to play the politics that usually states of 10 15 20 million are conducting so they have this initial inherent need to delegate to the market to delegate to proxies and surrogates and they have they've embraced that um because they had no other choice and we shouldn't forget unlike Israel they have that massive capital influx from hydrocarbons which means they're extremely wealthy and they can afford to experiment throwing money at something that might work but might not work which is a sort of luxury that we don't have in the UK we don't have we can't play with taxpayers money and say oh let's try this out oh it didn't work oh we we wasted a billion dollars of this on this or billion pounds um but what the UAE have done have they've created interdependence across the Middle East and Africa but also interdependence with Russia with China where they be they have elevated their standing as a hub in all of these networks where nobody can do without them anymore there's if you want an issue solved in many of the conflicts you got to call 00971 right which is the UAE country code in order to get something done there's always they always have an access they have always access to an individual or someone or an actor that can sort something out and that kind of that level of interdependence makes them um very very relevant and even if you don't like what they're doing it's something you know you can't ignore them so uh as important as being able to build a networkcentric state is being able to protect against uh uh influence and incursion from from other states who have successfully built that networkcentric approach um we've seen a lot of Israeli narratives entering the British media uh as an example um a particularly striking example for me was um seeing uh almost coordinated across the right-wing press was the discussion of how Britain should be taking advice from the UAE on counterterrorism particularly as it pertains to the Muslim Brotherhood now to me this was quite transparent in the sense that the Muslim Brotherhood is is a concern for the UAE um and it's clearly that I'm trying to project this influence uh in into Britain um so so how do we predict against this and and how why is it that an enormous section of the British sort of public narrative was was actually quite taken and convinced by this still is I think that the the Amirati campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood framing the Muslim Brotherhood as the the biggest peril and threat to national security which it arguably isn't in the UAE but certainly is not in the UK because it's very much non-existent but this sort of um this scarecrow that they've created this boogeyman of the Islamist has certainly been a narrative that they've exported via very weird uh unusual sort of nodes in their information network so they're usually white non-Muslim um not even necessarily CVE experts so not expert in countering violent extremism sometimes MPs uh and politicians making statement about it um and obviously we had in 2014 we had that investigation into the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK which was very much came at the back of quite a lot of pressure from the UAE to investigate the Muslim Brotherhood as a coherent sort of uh entity although I'd say it's probably more of a network than anything um the fact that a lot of NOS's which are Muslim NOS's in the UK are listed uh in the UAE as terrorist organizations all of these issues are very peculiar and then you think why would certain people who have no affiliation with the Muslim community or with you know with anything to do with Islam or the Middle East why would they care about so much about the the Muslim Brotherhood which isn't even a party or an entity a cohesive entity in this country and then you look at you know funding then you look at how these information networks were built up and what the UAE have done very successfully again goes back to orchestrating networks is they've developed their own um academic networks of experts CBE experts which are you know in the space of countering violent extremism dradicalization funding for these kind of research for think tanks and re research centers who are operating in that space certain individuals who they financed to propagate that particular narrative that the Muslim Brotherhood is the greatest threat they've obviously have their own lobbying networks which work through MPs and staffers in in Westminster to kind of push a particular narrative how bad the Muslim Brotherhood is they've used their corporate networks even I mean you know they're major investor in in the in in the UK they bring a lot of foreign direct investment and the UK you know in many ways has has been lobbing all the golf countries of saying "Come on you know bring more money into the UK." You know they look at the golf as an ATM and and the UAE were initially not anymore but back in the day 10 years ago and more quite happy to oblige and and put the money in with strings attached and I think we need to differentiate between money from Saudi Qatar or or Kuwait or or the UAE the UAE has the strongest strings attached the UAE used this as a bargaining chip they know that once there is an interdependence once they once you have um some sort of leverage they're willing to use it even if it's up against the if they're up against the UK because they see themselves as equal and in the 2014 um investigation in the Muslim Brotherhood what we see is that that at the time the UK wanted to sell defense equipment to to the UAE and the UAE said "Yeah we have to buy it but you'll have to do something about the Muslim Brotherhood issue." And so we have that investigation into the Muslim Brotherhood which was never published has gone away what we understand is obviously that the outcome of the report was it's not a threat because it's basically non-existent um but we see from time to time popping up having these narratives pop up again on the far right in this country um which is also not coincidental because the UAE has been very uh very strategic in their engagement with the far right across Europe not just in the UK farright groups who are Islamophobic um and it's funny for a you know Muslim country to kind of fund or work alongside and with Islamophobes um and a lot of it is coincidental but a lot of it is also you know with direct sort of affiliation between UAE entities and and sort of far-right entities and what they've achieved is created a network that have created a false consensus around the issue that the Muslim Brotherhood is a threat um which has you know been used to to to uh kind of fight back against certain critiques critics of the of of the UAE against certain academics who are critical of the UAE against journalists uh it was almost like a bit like the scarecrow and boogeyman that the Israelis are using this idea of oh they're people are you kind of frame someone as an anti-semite what the UAE are doing they're framing someone as a terrorism supporter as a Muslim Brotherhood supporter and this is quite interesting where the Israeli and Imirati networks converge is by saying Hamas obviously Hamas is terrorist organization but Hamas is the Muslim Brotherhood is Islamism and at the same time this is the Israeli narrative and the the Emirati are saying yeah you know this is true I mean all the Islamists are basically terrorists so it's not just don't just single out Hamas all of the any sort of and for the Emirati point of view any sort of Muslim entity any civil societal group that is Muslim or Islamic in any in any way is framed as being on a conveyor belt as they say to terrorism they're saying if you enter a moderate Islamic NGO you're on a on a on a linear sort of uh trajectory to becoming a jerist so for them there's no differentiation between ISIS and al-Qaeda on one end and let's say a moderate Islamic NGO in the UK which is homegrown based by you know built around British Muslims and this I think is the threat yeah and and do you think that there's a kind of consensus that um that the weak point of the Achilles heel in European societies today is the far right so you you mentioned the UAE kind of pushing this narrative amongst the far right um the Israeli foreign minister recently announced that Israel would officially engage with farright parties in Europe as well which is even more peculiar than a Muslim country that you have now the Israeli government dealing with parties like the French National Front who are you know John Le Pen was a Holocaust denier um so is that are these kind of um disinformation networks converging around a consensus that the far right is the way to to to proceed so the way information networks work is they work via useful idiots right they're sort of coincidental surrogates not all of them are necessarily directly paid to do this but if you present an Islamophobe or an anti-semite uh with and that's most yeah you most of the far right are in that space right they're anti-semitic and islamophobic at the same time and you present them with a narrative of saying that there's a problem with Muslims especially conservative Muslims they they they are a problem they'll take it you don't have to pay them to say that um and so what the UAE are doing they're basically producing the content they're producing the academic papers quote unquote with some kind of weird think tanks and and pseudo experts and then they're flooding it into the market and they're quite happy to to comply it's quite interesting that I think at the time which was the for national had a relationship with the UAE or at least they had used the UAE bank to clear some of their payments there is a relationship there uh and the fact that the Israelis are willing to go with anti-semmites and the Amiratis are willing to go with Islamophobes to advance their national interest shows that the far right in particular and not exclusively but the far right is a is a very very useful Trojan horse to get into deep into the information space to shape perception on the ground and that's extremely dangerous and there are many of these Trojan horses i mean the far left as well is a Trojan horse for the Russians so I suppose it's a question of like uh anti-establishmentarianism yeah it's not it's not just anti-establishment um I think because the far right and farright populists are no longer just a French group and a French phenomenon certainly not on the continent in Europe i think you know some of the narratives they've been pushing have become mainstream yeah right uh and we see if you look at Germany the farright AFD just won about a fifth of the vote and that's you know after a couple of years in in in in business uh we see the same in Austria see the same in France um so the far right and if we hadn't had a first pass to post system in the UK we would certainly have a bigger representation of the reform party uh in in in our parliament so and I'm not saying reform party is necessarily on that same spectrum as the AFD i mean they of right of the conservatives but not necess not necessarily far right but there are certainly people in the reform party who have far-right uh sentiments and and and Islamophobic Islamophobic sentiments and so they're they they're becoming more and more mainstream and the problem is if you have a Muslim country Muslim country like the UAE to advance their own agenda because what they want is kind of create a palatable palatable environment to plug their own security concerns that they have domestically to kind of demobilize civil society because that's what it's all about for the Amiratis they see any form of civil society as inherently subversive and inherently problematic for regime security if you now get your partners in the west to embrace that in you know because then you're basically embracing authoritarianism because a clampdown in the Muslim Brotherhood and NOS and civil society is a clam is an authoritarian clampdown on on freedom of speech on on academic freedom and so on and that's where the Emiratis are in because that's what they're doing and now they're trying to legitimize it by saying "Look all we do is fighting terrorism and everyone here that you can see is a terrorist if you pray too much your beard is too long you uh you know you use Islam to justify your your civil societal activism you're basically a terrorist if it turns out to be the case that the Emiratis are um actors that have manipulated or used the UK in this fashion which other partners in the Middle East more broadly would you would you say it is in in Britain's better interest to turn to in order to um in in order to pursue British interests in a way that that that are more palatable to it well I don't think we should be picking and choosing you know um there are certainly some countries who are more neutral they're actually positively neutral the UAE are not neutral the UAE have an agenda we need to be aware of it and you know for example when it comes to Sudan I don't think the UAE is a good partner when it comes to Yemen I don't think the UAE a good partner when it comes to Libya I don't think they're a good partner when it comes to Palestine I don't think the UAE are a good partner because they have opposing views on our values uh on other things when it comes to the reconstruction of Gaza when it comes to reconstruction of Syria I can't see how the UAE are not going to play a part a role in it they just have quite a lot of cash um and and they're also quite willing to play a role they will be playing a role so we have to work with them on on certain uh uh elements of of our foreign security policy and also o orize them on on other issues where there is where they're conflicting interests i think that the smaller countries that are less proactive I mean the UAE is an extremely assertive and proactive actor which means they're willing to throw the UK under the bus if it serves their national interest as they've done in the past they're willing to uh to strongarm the UK when they can they're willing to use tactics which are coercive against the UK um and so even the Saudis who are in a you know much bigger country in many ways are a lot more hesitant to use their their power their leverage their influence to coers the UK into uh into submission i do think that the smaller countries like Oman like Qatar who have usually very neutral don't have their own agenda are willing to just play an intermediary role are willing to oblige as well um to find common ground based on consensus rather than coercion and compulsion these are the sort of partners we should be working through they can unlock a lot of the conflicts and they're doing that not to advance their national interest i mean Qatar doesn't have a national interest i mean they have obviously an interest in in making sure Palestinians have a right of self-determination but in the if you look at the way that they've played the role as a mediator they've been very very uh very much you know in the middle of the road of trying not to take a position being neutral and advancing their interest oman the same thing when it comes to Yemen and I think anything to do from straight of Hormuz we need to speak to the Iranians to down to the Babal Mandab in Yemen we have to speak to the Houthis and potentially Somalia as well oman is the is the kind of country that has these relationships we need to work alongside them and they've there's no history for the Omani to ever use that leverage against us they're quite happy to work with the UK qatar is quite happy to work with the UK um and Saudi Arabia I think to an extent is also happy to work with the UK the UAE over you know we had a lot of disagreements i think um from a UK perspective we had a lot of disagreements with the UAE over the last couple of years of over them allowing the Russians to bypass sanctions for their funding of these kind of non-state actors such as the RSF where they kind of perpetuate and even incentivize um and and and really escalate the war in Sudan which goes against the British interest the way that they funded certain radical groups also on the far on the you know in in the in Libya for example um there are certain issues that we have with the UAE we don't have these issues with a lot of other Gulf countries yeah and the UAE have the relations have have really the relations between the UK and the UAE in many ways have been you know have been uh cooling down quite a bit oh I see um over all of this and that also means that the UAE are less interested in the UK they're less interested to work alongside the UK they're trying to withdraw some of their investments and the only sort of engagement that the UAE is still doing in the UK is via Dubai and the Maktum family yeah but the al-Nafan and Abu Dhabi in particular are trying to disengage from from the UK because they're saying they're not necessarily a partner we can work through um and uh so that you know that's quite interesting but the interesting thing is also the UAC themselves are the middle power between Russia uh China and and the US and they feel like we're they're a middle power that can connect all these different players in a in a multipolar a polar world um where they don't need to abide by anyone and the certainly not by the UK which they think is a limited you know fairly middle another middle power in Europe that have less power in the Middle East than they do of increasing irrelevance yeah indeed uh okay this is super fascinating i think that's I think that's mostly it for me bez I think that is actually all we have time for pretty much um should we should we go to the closing yeah we can we can just like summarize essentially so I mean essentially we uh we highlight uh the fact that uh uh and correct me if you think I've said I've misstated anything but we we basically highlight the fact that it is not that we we need that we as Britain need to to recognize that it is not in fact always in our strategic interests to follow follow uh America's lead on various foreign policy issues that it is incredibly important for Britain to determine what exactly it is what its own security interests are that Britain has historically had uh a uh a huge advant advantage in so far as London is an incredibly interconnected place uh there are you know networks of all kinds and flavors here from financial networks to to human capital networks uh technological networks research networks academic networks journalistic networks and so on uh and that in order to better and that and and that Britain used to in some sense um employ these networks more efficiently in order to uh secure its own strategic interests and has uh in the intervening the intervening decades seceded from doing so as you say white whiteall has become this castle on a hill with uh with with high walls and that in some sense it is in its interests to lower the walls and engage in more organiz in in more uh connective activities between the networks that currently exist here and that that is a better way for for for London to uh to exert influence in in the world at large uh we touched on the fact that uh that the UK's that the UK is not seen as having so much power as such uh in so far as power is concerned with with uh with finance and uh military might but rather a lot of influence which generally is predicated on relationships drawing back to the idea of networks um that are uh that are so some that are so fundamental and that increasingly as we we move towards a a multipolar/apolar world uh where we start to see power become increasingly diffuse uh along uh the global stage particularly as America uh starts to retreat uh in a process that's been going on uh since 2008 since since withdrawal from Iraq as you mentioned there creates a lot of threats but also opportunities in so far as you have these middle powers that project uh influence uh far in excess of what was previously possible and the UAE is the most uh the UAE and Israel I suppose to some extent are the most salient examples of this and in how they've operated over the course of the last 15 or 20 years and that it is important for Britain to keep this in mind both as far as defending itself against uh you know infiltration uh in the sort of battle of ideas and battle of narratives um uh but also from precluding its own institutions and networks from being um upended or misused for you know contra its own national interests that one it needs to be cognizant of how to protect against this and secondly that it that it already has a natural advantage in this as a result of its activity over the last 300 years and that these are things that policy makers ought to think about when they chart a new course for Britain in this uh multipolar/apolar world i agree does that sound fair very good summary awesome thank you so much well thank you for joining us um to our audience if you enjoyed this please like and subscribe and comment below and share with your friends fix the wall

Period	28 Feb 2025
Held at	Pickthall House, United Kingdom