Abstract
This article advances a new analysis of stupidity as a distinctive form of cognitive failing. Section 1 outlines some problems in explicating this notion and suggests some desiderata. Section 2 sketches an existing model of stupidity, found in Kant and Flaubert, which serves as a foil for my own view. In section 3, I introduce my theory: I analyse stupidity as form of conceptual self-hampering, characterised by a specific aetiology and with a range of deleterious effects. In section 4, I show how this proposal meets the desiderata and I clarify how it diverges from existing accounts. My position is close to a ‘public health approach’, in contrast to the virtue/vice framework employed by Engel or Mulligan.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 562-580 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES |
Volume | 27 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 23 Jun 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 8 Aug 2019 |
Keywords
- epistemic vices
- epistemology
- intelligence
- Kant
- Philosophy of mind
- stupidity