Adam Smith, David Hume, and the problem of moral relativism

TY - JOUR

T1 - Adam Smith, David Hume, and the problem of moral relativism

AU - Sagar, Paul

PY - 2025

Y1 - 2025

N2 - Despite the considerable attention paid to Adam Smith’s ethical theory over the past quarter of a century, at least one area of his thought remains outstanding for the lack of interest it has received: Part 5 of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ‘Of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation’. This is unfortunate, however, insofar as there are good reasons for thinking that Part 5 is important to Smith’s project. The following article substantiates this importance by placing Smith’s intervention in the context of David Hume’s earlier attempts to wrestle with the problem of moral relativism. The connections between Hume and Smith on this matter have not previously been explored, yet doing so is crucial for gaining a more complete appreciation of Smith’s moral thought. Beyond this historical intervention, however, I also contend that neither Smith nor Hume offer satisfactory answers to the philosophical challenge posed by moral relativism. Despite remaining the two outstanding theorists in the tradition of ethical sentimentalism, both Smith and Hume fall short on this score. Insofar as moral relativism remains a challenge to ethical sentimentalists today, proponents of this tradition must look elsewhere for solutions.

AB - Despite the considerable attention paid to Adam Smith’s ethical theory over the past quarter of a century, at least one area of his thought remains outstanding for the lack of interest it has received: Part 5 of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ‘Of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation’. This is unfortunate, however, insofar as there are good reasons for thinking that Part 5 is important to Smith’s project. The following article substantiates this importance by placing Smith’s intervention in the context of David Hume’s earlier attempts to wrestle with the problem of moral relativism. The connections between Hume and Smith on this matter have not previously been explored, yet doing so is crucial for gaining a more complete appreciation of Smith’s moral thought. Beyond this historical intervention, however, I also contend that neither Smith nor Hume offer satisfactory answers to the philosophical challenge posed by moral relativism. Despite remaining the two outstanding theorists in the tradition of ethical sentimentalism, both Smith and Hume fall short on this score. Insofar as moral relativism remains a challenge to ethical sentimentalists today, proponents of this tradition must look elsewhere for solutions.

M3 - Article

SN - 0265-0525

JO - Social Philosophy and Policy

JF - Social Philosophy and Policy

ER -