Abstract
This article examines the Iranian military intervention in the civil war in
Dhofar, Oman, from 1972 to 1975, focusing in particular on the often
strained relationship between the Imperial Iranian Task Force (IITF) and
the officers of the British armed forces seconded to command the Sultan
of Oman’s Armed Forces (SAF). This article concludes that while the IITF
was hampered by its own internal shortcomings and also distrust of its
British allies, it made an important contribution to the Sultanate’s victory
in the Dhofar conflict. The Anglo-Iranian relationship in this war also
highlights the potential challenges that Western militaries can face when
advising and mentoring non-Western allies in future expeditionary
conflicts.
Dhofar, Oman, from 1972 to 1975, focusing in particular on the often
strained relationship between the Imperial Iranian Task Force (IITF) and
the officers of the British armed forces seconded to command the Sultan
of Oman’s Armed Forces (SAF). This article concludes that while the IITF
was hampered by its own internal shortcomings and also distrust of its
British allies, it made an important contribution to the Sultanate’s victory
in the Dhofar conflict. The Anglo-Iranian relationship in this war also
highlights the potential challenges that Western militaries can face when
advising and mentoring non-Western allies in future expeditionary
conflicts.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 90 |
| Number of pages | 110 |
| Journal | British Journal for Military History |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 3 Nov 2017 |
Keywords
- Oman
- Dhofar War
- Iran