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An Ultimatum Game Model for the Evolution of Privacy in Jointly Managed Content

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingOther chapter contribution

Sarah Rajtmajer, Anna Squicciarini, Jose M Such, Justin Semonsen, Andrew Belmonte

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationDecision and Game Theory for Security - 8th International Conference, GameSec 2017, Proceedings
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages112-130
Number of pages19
Volume10575 LNCS
ISBN (Print)9783319687100
DOIs
StateE-pub ahead of print - 4 Oct 2017
Event8th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2017 - Vienna, Austria
Duration: 23 Oct 201725 Oct 2017

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume10575 LNCS
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Conference

Conference8th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2017
CountryAustria
CityVienna
Period23/10/201725/10/2017

King's Authors

Abstract

Content sharing in social networks is now one of the most common activities of internet users. In sharing content, users often have to make access control or privacy decisions that impact other stakeholders or co-owners. These decisions involve negotiation, either implicitly or explicitly. Over time, as users engage in these interactions, their own privacy attitudes evolve, influenced by and consequently influencing their peers. In this paper, we present a variation of the one-shot Ultimatum Game, wherein we model individual users interacting with their peers to make privacy decisions about shared content. We analyze the effects of sharing dynamics on individuals’ privacy preferences over repeated interactions of the game. We theoretically demonstrate conditions under which users’ access decisions eventually converge, and characterize this limit as a function of inherent individual preferences at the start of the game and willingness to concede these preferences over time. We provide simulations highlighting specific insights on global and local influence, short-term interactions and the effects of homophily on consensus.

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