Abstract
I argue that (i) the Proslogion 2 argument rests on Meinongian assumptions, and (ii) Meinongianism is more defensible than many metaphysicians think, but (iii) although Meinongianism can be defended from (venerable) objections, the most promising (known) strategies for doing that call into question the cogency of the Proslogion 2 argument, so (iv) that argument is less than convincing, even if Meinongianism is true.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1243-1276 |
Number of pages | 34 |
Journal | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
Volume | 77 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2021 |
Keywords
- Anselm
- Existence
- Meinong
- Metaphysics
- Metaphysics of intentionality