Anselm, Existence, and the Metaphysics of Intentionality: Proslogion 2 Revisited

Christopher Hughes*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

I argue that (i) the Proslogion 2 argument rests on Meinongian assumptions, and (ii) Meinongianism is more defensible than many metaphysicians think, but (iii) although Meinongianism can be defended from (venerable) objections, the most promising (known) strategies for doing that call into question the cogency of the Proslogion 2 argument, so (iv) that argument is less than convincing, even if Meinongianism is true.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1243-1276
Number of pages34
JournalRevista Portuguesa de Filosofia
Volume77
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021

Keywords

  • Anselm
  • Existence
  • Meinong
  • Metaphysics
  • Metaphysics of intentionality

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