Are We of Equal Moral Worth?

Andrea Sangiovanni*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

This chapter invites readers to abandon the idea that humanity has an unconditional, nonrelational, and intrinsic value that grounds strong duties of egalitarian respect for persons. Instead, it develops the view that treating as inferior is wrong, when it is wrong, because it attacks another's capacity to develop and maintain an integral sense of self. Treating as inferior is wrong when and because it threatens harm rather than undermines dignity. But why care about our capacity for flourishing in the first place? The chapter argues that we have reasons to care about the flourishing of human beings (and other sentient animals) that are grounded not in the nonrelational worth of their psychological capacities but in the value of the relation between those capacities and their conscious point of view on the world.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationRethinking the Value of Humanity
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages248-272
Number of pages25
ISBN (Electronic)9780197539361
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2023

Keywords

  • dignity
  • flourishing
  • humanity
  • moral equality
  • relational value

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