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Arguing for assistance-based responsibilities: are intuitions enough?

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Arguing for assistance-based responsibilities: are intuitions enough? / Valentini, Laura.

In: Ethics and Global Politics, Vol. 12, No. 1, 03.2019, p. 24 - 32.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Valentini, L 2019, 'Arguing for assistance-based responsibilities: are intuitions enough?', Ethics and Global Politics, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 24 - 32. https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1565606

APA

Valentini, L. (2019). Arguing for assistance-based responsibilities: are intuitions enough? Ethics and Global Politics, 12(1), 24 - 32. https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1565606

Vancouver

Valentini L. Arguing for assistance-based responsibilities: are intuitions enough? Ethics and Global Politics. 2019 Mar;12(1):24 - 32. https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1565606

Author

Valentini, Laura. / Arguing for assistance-based responsibilities: are intuitions enough?. In: Ethics and Global Politics. 2019 ; Vol. 12, No. 1. pp. 24 - 32.

Bibtex Download

@article{837910c2cdb443d99d38a85655ac9c02,
title = "Arguing for assistance-based responsibilities: are intuitions enough?",
abstract = "Millions of people in our world are in need of assistance: from the global poor, to refugees, from the victims of natural disasters, to those of violent crimes. What are our responsibilities towards them? Christian Barry and Gerhard {\O}verland?s answer is plausible and straightforward: we have enforceable duties to assist others in need whenever we can do so ?at relatively moderate cost to ourselves, and others?. Barry and {\O}verland defend this answer on the ground that it best fits our intuitions in a variety of hypothetical rescue scenarios. I argue that, although Barry and {\O}verland?s view is intuitively appealing, appeal to intuitive cases is insufficient to vindicate it satisfactorily. Intuitive cases alone do not allow us to establish: (i) what costs count as moderate and (ii) whether assistance-based responsibilities are, in fact, enforceable. These considerations suggest that Barry and {\O}verland?s defence of their preferred answer to the assistance question may be incomplete.",
keywords = "assistance, justice, easy rescue, intuitions, reflective equilibrium",
author = "Laura Valentini",
note = "copyright 2019 The Author",
year = "2019",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1080/16544951.2019.1565606",
language = "English",
volume = "12",
pages = "24 -- 32",
journal = "Ethics & Global Politics",
issn = "1654-6369",
publisher = "Department of Government",
number = "1",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Arguing for assistance-based responsibilities: are intuitions enough?

AU - Valentini, Laura

N1 - copyright 2019 The Author

PY - 2019/3

Y1 - 2019/3

N2 - Millions of people in our world are in need of assistance: from the global poor, to refugees, from the victims of natural disasters, to those of violent crimes. What are our responsibilities towards them? Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland?s answer is plausible and straightforward: we have enforceable duties to assist others in need whenever we can do so ?at relatively moderate cost to ourselves, and others?. Barry and Øverland defend this answer on the ground that it best fits our intuitions in a variety of hypothetical rescue scenarios. I argue that, although Barry and Øverland?s view is intuitively appealing, appeal to intuitive cases is insufficient to vindicate it satisfactorily. Intuitive cases alone do not allow us to establish: (i) what costs count as moderate and (ii) whether assistance-based responsibilities are, in fact, enforceable. These considerations suggest that Barry and Øverland?s defence of their preferred answer to the assistance question may be incomplete.

AB - Millions of people in our world are in need of assistance: from the global poor, to refugees, from the victims of natural disasters, to those of violent crimes. What are our responsibilities towards them? Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland?s answer is plausible and straightforward: we have enforceable duties to assist others in need whenever we can do so ?at relatively moderate cost to ourselves, and others?. Barry and Øverland defend this answer on the ground that it best fits our intuitions in a variety of hypothetical rescue scenarios. I argue that, although Barry and Øverland?s view is intuitively appealing, appeal to intuitive cases is insufficient to vindicate it satisfactorily. Intuitive cases alone do not allow us to establish: (i) what costs count as moderate and (ii) whether assistance-based responsibilities are, in fact, enforceable. These considerations suggest that Barry and Øverland?s defence of their preferred answer to the assistance question may be incomplete.

KW - assistance

KW - justice

KW - easy rescue

KW - intuitions

KW - reflective equilibrium

U2 - 10.1080/16544951.2019.1565606

DO - 10.1080/16544951.2019.1565606

M3 - Article

VL - 12

SP - 24

EP - 32

JO - Ethics & Global Politics

JF - Ethics & Global Politics

SN - 1654-6369

IS - 1

ER -

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