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Aristotle against Delos: Pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics X

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)284-306
JournalPhronesis
Volume61
Issue number3
Early online date4 Jun 2016
DOIs
Accepted/In press28 Feb 2016
E-pub ahead of print4 Jun 2016
PublishedJun 2016

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Abstract

Two crucial questions, if unanswered, impede our understanding of Aristotle’s account of pleasure in EN X.4-5: a) what are the activities that pleasure is said to complete, and b) in virtue of what does pleasure always accompany these activities? The answers fall in place if we read Aristotle as responding to the Delian challenge that the finest, best, and most pleasant are not united in one and the same thing (EN I.8). I propose an “ethical” reading of EN X.4 according to which the best activities in question are those integral to the exercise of virtue.

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