Abstract
Towards the beginning of the third book of De libero arbitrio, Augustine
defends the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. His defence appears to involve the idea that the will is essentially free. I discuss and evaluate Augustine’s reasons for thinking that the will is essentially free, and the way that Augustine moves from the essential freedom of the will to the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge.
defends the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. His defence appears to involve the idea that the will is essentially free. I discuss and evaluate Augustine’s reasons for thinking that the will is essentially free, and the way that Augustine moves from the essential freedom of the will to the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 315-332 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | RELIGIOUS STUDIES |
Volume | 52 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 19 Jun 2015 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Sept 2016 |