Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 605-627 |
Journal | PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH |
Volume | 99 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 20 May 2018 |
DOIs | |
E-pub ahead of print | 20 May 2018 |
Published | 26 Nov 2019 |
Additional links |
Being More Realistic About_LITTLEJOHN_Publishedonline20May2018_GREEN AAM
Being_more_realistic_about_reasons_ppr_final_draft.pdf, 298 KB, application/pdf
Uploaded date:03 Jun 2020
Version:Accepted author manuscript
Accepted author manuscript
This paper looks at whether it is possible to unify the requirements of rationality with the demands of normative reasons. It might seem impossible to do because one depends upon the agent's perspective and the other upon features of the situation. Enter Reasons Perspectivism. Reasons perspectivists think they can show that rationality does consist in responding correctly to reasons by placing epistemic constraints on these reasons. They think that if normative reasons are subject to the right epistemic constraints, rational requirements will correspond to the demands generated by normative reasons. While this proposal is prima facie plausible, it cannot ultimately unify reasons and rationality. There is no epistemic constraint that can do what reasons perspectivists would need it to do. Some constraints are too strict. The rest are too slack. This points to a general problem with the reasons-first program. Once we recognize that the agent's epistemic position helps determine what she should do, we have to reject the idea that the features of the agent's situation can help determine what we should do. Either rationality crowds out reasons and their demands or the reasons will make unreasonable demands.
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