Abstract
In this paper I argue that a specific case of belief – religious belief – shows in a particularly striking way that the project of turning belief into knowledge with the addition of necessary and sufficient conditions is misguided, and that a different account of cognition is therefore needed. In the final part of the paper, I gesture at my proposal for such an alternative account. This account, I claim, is both traditional and novel – traditional insofar as it builds on some insights from the history of epistemology which should, in my view, be recovered; novel insofar as, in so doing, it proposes a conception of knowledge significantly different from what was regarded until recently as the ‘standard’ account.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 283-306 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | Rivista di Filosofia |
Volume | 110 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 1 Aug 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Aug 2019 |
Keywords
- Knowledge, Justified True Belief, Natural Theology, Reformed Epistemology, Justification, Warrant, Externalism, Plantinga, Gettier.