Abstract
I explore what Bernard Williams means by regarding one’s action “purely externally, as one might regard anyone else’s action”, and how it links to regret and agent-regret. I suggest some ways that we might understand the external view: as a failure to recognise what one has done, in terms of Williams’s distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic luck, and as akin to Thomas Nagel’s distinction between an internal and external view. I argue that none of these captures what Williams was getting at, because they do not allow one to take a view on one’s action. I offer two alternative accounts. One turns around what we identify with, the other concerns what we care about. Both accounts capture how I might regret, rather than agent-regret, my own action. I demonstrate that these can explain the relationship between an insurance payout and the external view, and explain the agent-relativity of agent-regret.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 49-66 |
| Journal | Journal of the American Philosophical Association |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 6 Sept 2018 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 6 Sept 2018 |
Keywords
- Bernard Williams
- Ethics
- Thomas Nagel
- External View
- Agent-Regret