Brentano on Act, Content and Intentionality

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Abstract

The paper offers a reconstruction of Brentano’s notion of act content that identifies the content of a mental act with a combination of marks (Merkmale) or a single such mark. I will first clarify the role act content plays in Brentano’s philosophy of psychology and then go on to locate the proposed notion of content in the historical context of Brentano’s work as well as in his writings at the time of Psychologie. I will defend it against potential objections and explore its explanatory potential.
Original languageEnglish
JournalGrazer Philosophische Studien
Volume100
Issue number1&2
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 16 Jan 2023

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