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Can Multiple Realisation be Explained?

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Can Multiple Realisation be Explained? / Franklin, Alexander.

In: PHILOSOPHY, 31.07.2020.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Franklin, A 2020, 'Can Multiple Realisation be Explained?', PHILOSOPHY.

APA

Franklin, A. (Accepted/In press). Can Multiple Realisation be Explained? PHILOSOPHY.

Vancouver

Franklin A. Can Multiple Realisation be Explained? PHILOSOPHY. 2020 Jul 31.

Author

Franklin, Alexander. / Can Multiple Realisation be Explained?. In: PHILOSOPHY. 2020.

Bibtex Download

@article{251e36390259496482832f9e520573b4,
title = "Can Multiple Realisation be Explained?",
abstract = "Multiple realisation prompts the question: how is it that multiple systems all exhibit the same phenomena despite their different underlying properties? In this paper I develop a framework for addressing that question and argue that multiple realisation can be reductively explained. I illustrate this position by applying the framework to a simple example – the multiple realisation of electrical conductivity. I defend my account by addressing potential objections: contra (e.g.) Polger and Shapiro (2016), Batterman (2018), and Sober (2000), I claim that multiple realisation is commonplace, that it can be explained, but that it requires a sui generis reductive explanatory strategy. ",
author = "Alexander Franklin",
year = "2020",
month = jul,
day = "31",
language = "English",
journal = "PHILOSOPHY",
issn = "0031-8191",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Can Multiple Realisation be Explained?

AU - Franklin, Alexander

PY - 2020/7/31

Y1 - 2020/7/31

N2 - Multiple realisation prompts the question: how is it that multiple systems all exhibit the same phenomena despite their different underlying properties? In this paper I develop a framework for addressing that question and argue that multiple realisation can be reductively explained. I illustrate this position by applying the framework to a simple example – the multiple realisation of electrical conductivity. I defend my account by addressing potential objections: contra (e.g.) Polger and Shapiro (2016), Batterman (2018), and Sober (2000), I claim that multiple realisation is commonplace, that it can be explained, but that it requires a sui generis reductive explanatory strategy.

AB - Multiple realisation prompts the question: how is it that multiple systems all exhibit the same phenomena despite their different underlying properties? In this paper I develop a framework for addressing that question and argue that multiple realisation can be reductively explained. I illustrate this position by applying the framework to a simple example – the multiple realisation of electrical conductivity. I defend my account by addressing potential objections: contra (e.g.) Polger and Shapiro (2016), Batterman (2018), and Sober (2000), I claim that multiple realisation is commonplace, that it can be explained, but that it requires a sui generis reductive explanatory strategy.

M3 - Article

JO - PHILOSOPHY

JF - PHILOSOPHY

SN - 0031-8191

ER -

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