Abstract
We exploit the large rise in relative performance awards in the UK over the last two decades to investigate whether these contracts improve the alignment between CEO pay and performance. We first document that corporate governance appears to be stronger when institutional ownership is greater. Then, using hand-collected data from annual reports on explicit contracts, we show that (1) CEO pay still responds more to increases in the firms’ stock performance than to decreases and, importantly, this asymmetry is stronger when corporate governance is weak as measured by low institutional ownership; (2) “pay-for-luck” persists as remuneration increases with random positive shocks, even when the CEO has equity awards that explicitly condition on firm performance relative to peer firms in the same sector. A major reason why relative performance contracts do not eliminate pay for luck is that CEOs who fail to meet the terms of their past performance awards are able to obtain more generous new equity rewards in the future in weakly governed firms. We show the mechanism operates both through the quantum of shares and the structure of new contracts. These findings suggest that reforms to the formal structure of CEO pay contracts are unlikely to align incentives in the absence of strong corporate governance.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 2513-2542 |
| Journal | Journal of the European Economic Association |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2021 |
Keywords
- CEO Pay
- incentives
- equity plans