China’s Arrival in the Great Sanctions Game: A Learnt Response, Made by America

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Abstract

The article examines the development of China’s sanctions legislation in an era of strategic competition. Beijing’s new sanctions regime is informed by its experience as a sanctionee, with much of the new legislation almost directly mirrored on sanctions enacted against China by the West. The article seeks to account for Beijing’s interest in pursuing a formalised approach, employing four explanatory ‘models’, namely: national security threats; retaliatory economic competition, status-seeking and prestige, and domestic constituents. Despite China’s creation of a new legislative framework, the article argues that Beijing will continue to implement informal tactics for the most part, while employing formal measures in a highly measured way. Ultimately this two-pronged approach delivers a highly effective and adaptable toolkit of statecraft for China as an ascending power. However, there are normative implications for the orderly conduct of global trade and political cooperation as more states enter a great sanctions race.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Asian Security and International Affairs
Volume12
Issue number1
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 30 Jun 2024

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