‘Clouds of Mutual Suspicion': Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement in the Mediterranean

TY - JOUR

T1 - ‘Clouds of Mutual Suspicion':

T2 - Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement in the Mediterranean

AU - Gilchrist, Jessi

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - This article reconsiders scholarly indictments of Neville Chamberlain’s Mediterranean appeasement strategy. It explains why, out of several alternatives available, Chamberlain prioritized repairing cooperation with Benito Mussolini in the years following the Abyssinia Crisis. This article argues that Chamberlain ultimately decided to pursue an understanding with Italy because the British stood the most to gain from the Italian option. By the summer of 1937, Britain faced the possibility of war in Europe, the Far East, and the Mediterranean. Blocked from pursuing bet- ter relations with both the Germans and the Japanese, Chamberlain turned to reconcile relations with the Italians to relieve Britain’s strategic predicament. But an agreement with Italy also offered to strengthen Britain’s imperial position and make progress towards general appease- ment. The debate that emerged between Neville Chamberlain and Anthony Eden over the direction of British foreign policy demonstrates that while the Foreign Secretary put forward a number of alternative policies, Chamberlain believed that the Italian option would best serve British interests. For too long, historians have pointed to Eden’s resigna- tion as proof of Chamberlain’s failure to consider alternative policies without an adequate discussion of why he favoured an agreement with the Italians.

AB - This article reconsiders scholarly indictments of Neville Chamberlain’s Mediterranean appeasement strategy. It explains why, out of several alternatives available, Chamberlain prioritized repairing cooperation with Benito Mussolini in the years following the Abyssinia Crisis. This article argues that Chamberlain ultimately decided to pursue an understanding with Italy because the British stood the most to gain from the Italian option. By the summer of 1937, Britain faced the possibility of war in Europe, the Far East, and the Mediterranean. Blocked from pursuing bet- ter relations with both the Germans and the Japanese, Chamberlain turned to reconcile relations with the Italians to relieve Britain’s strategic predicament. But an agreement with Italy also offered to strengthen Britain’s imperial position and make progress towards general appease- ment. The debate that emerged between Neville Chamberlain and Anthony Eden over the direction of British foreign policy demonstrates that while the Foreign Secretary put forward a number of alternative policies, Chamberlain believed that the Italian option would best serve British interests. For too long, historians have pointed to Eden’s resigna- tion as proof of Chamberlain’s failure to consider alternative policies without an adequate discussion of why he favoured an agreement with the Italians.

KW - Neville Chamberlain

KW - Anthony Eden

KW - Mediterranean Appeasement

KW - Italian Fascism

KW - Imperial Cooperation

U2 - 10.1080/07075332.2021.1925945

DO - 10.1080/07075332.2021.1925945

M3 - Article

SN - 1949-6540

JO - The International History Review

JF - The International History Review

ER -