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Cognitive Models are Distinguished by Content, not Format

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Original languageEnglish
JournalPHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Accepted/In press7 Nov 2019

King's Authors

Abstract

Cognitive scientists often describe the mind as constructing and using models of aspects of the environment, but it is not obvious what makes something a model, as opposed to a mere representation. The leading proposal among philosophers is that models are structural representations, and are therefore distinguished by their format. However, an alternative conception is suggested by recent work in artificial intelligence, on which models are distinguished by their content. This paper outlines the two conceptions, and argues for the content conception, against the standard philosophical view.

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