Comparison of voting procedures using models of electoral competition with endogenous candidacy

Damien Bol, Arnaud Dellis*, Mandar Oak

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article surveys the latest advances in the literature on the comparative properties of different voting procedures in the context of political elections. In particular, we focus on the various attempts at understanding how different voting procedures affect the number of candidates and the positions they adopt. In public debate as well as academic scholarship, the comparative properties of different voting procedures has been a topic of enduring interest. This interest dates as far back as the late eighteenth century French philosopher-mathematicians Condorcet and Borda (and even earlier with the works of Lull and Cusanus), building up to the classic works of Arrow, May and Gibbard-Satthertwaite in the mid-twentieth century. The work in this tradition is largely confined to a rather abstract treatment of voting procedures, over an exogenously given set of alternatives.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Political Economy of Social Choices
Subtitle of host publicationStudies in Political Economy
Place of PublicationSwitzerland
PublisherSpringer
Pages21-54
Number of pages34
ISBN (Electronic)9783319401188
ISBN (Print)9783319401164
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 3 Sept 2016

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