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Conscious propositional attitudes and moral responsibility

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Conscious propositional attitudes and moral responsibility. / Peters, Uwe.

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 5, 24.09.2014, p. 585-597.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Peters, U 2014, 'Conscious propositional attitudes and moral responsibility', Journal of Moral Philosophy, vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 585-597. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681017

APA

Peters, U. (2014). Conscious propositional attitudes and moral responsibility. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 11(5), 585-597. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681017

Vancouver

Peters U. Conscious propositional attitudes and moral responsibility. Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2014 Sep 24;11(5):585-597. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681017

Author

Peters, Uwe. / Conscious propositional attitudes and moral responsibility. In: Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2014 ; Vol. 11, No. 5. pp. 585-597.

Bibtex Download

@article{da845799685a427f8de9c9d8adeded59,
title = "Conscious propositional attitudes and moral responsibility",
abstract = "By drawing on empirical evidence, Matt King and Peter Carruthers (2012) have recently argued that there are no conscious propositional attitudes, such as decisions, and that this undermines moral responsibility. Neil Levy (2012, forthcoming) responds to King and Carruthers, and claims that their considerations needn't worry theorists of moral responsibility. I argue that Levy's response to King and Carruthers' challenge to moral responsibility is unsatisfactory. After that, I propose what I take to be a preferable way of dealing with their challenge. I offer an account of moral responsibility that ties responsibility to consciously deciding to do X, as opposed to a conscious decision to do X. On this account, even if there are no conscious decisions, moral responsibility won't be undermined.",
keywords = "Conscious propositional attitudes, Global workspace, Moral responsibility",
author = "Uwe Peters",
year = "2014",
month = sep,
day = "24",
doi = "10.1163/17455243-4681017",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
pages = "585--597",
journal = "Journal of Moral Philosophy",
issn = "1740-4681",
publisher = "Brill",
number = "5",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Conscious propositional attitudes and moral responsibility

AU - Peters, Uwe

PY - 2014/9/24

Y1 - 2014/9/24

N2 - By drawing on empirical evidence, Matt King and Peter Carruthers (2012) have recently argued that there are no conscious propositional attitudes, such as decisions, and that this undermines moral responsibility. Neil Levy (2012, forthcoming) responds to King and Carruthers, and claims that their considerations needn't worry theorists of moral responsibility. I argue that Levy's response to King and Carruthers' challenge to moral responsibility is unsatisfactory. After that, I propose what I take to be a preferable way of dealing with their challenge. I offer an account of moral responsibility that ties responsibility to consciously deciding to do X, as opposed to a conscious decision to do X. On this account, even if there are no conscious decisions, moral responsibility won't be undermined.

AB - By drawing on empirical evidence, Matt King and Peter Carruthers (2012) have recently argued that there are no conscious propositional attitudes, such as decisions, and that this undermines moral responsibility. Neil Levy (2012, forthcoming) responds to King and Carruthers, and claims that their considerations needn't worry theorists of moral responsibility. I argue that Levy's response to King and Carruthers' challenge to moral responsibility is unsatisfactory. After that, I propose what I take to be a preferable way of dealing with their challenge. I offer an account of moral responsibility that ties responsibility to consciously deciding to do X, as opposed to a conscious decision to do X. On this account, even if there are no conscious decisions, moral responsibility won't be undermined.

KW - Conscious propositional attitudes

KW - Global workspace

KW - Moral responsibility

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U2 - 10.1163/17455243-4681017

DO - 10.1163/17455243-4681017

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84907708897

VL - 11

SP - 585

EP - 597

JO - Journal of Moral Philosophy

JF - Journal of Moral Philosophy

SN - 1740-4681

IS - 5

ER -

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