Consciousness and Content in Perception

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)
200 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Normal perception involves conscious experience of the world. What I call the Content View, (CV), attempts to account for this in terms of the representational content of perception. I offer a new argument against this view. Personal level perceptual content involves the determination of a fineness of grain in the predicational information conveyed to the subject. This depends on her exercise of personal level capacities such as categorization and discrimination that in turn require her conscious selective attention to specific worldly elements. Yet visual consciousness of the world obtains where conscious attention is not directed as well as where it is. So visual consciousness cannot be understood in terms of perceptual content. I elucidate and defend this line of argument and consider its implications for (CV).
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)41-54
JournalPhilosophical Perspectives
Volume31
Issue number1
Early online date25 Apr 2018
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 25 Apr 2018

Keywords

  • Perceptual consciousness, perceptual content, predication, categorization, discrimination, conscious attention

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Consciousness and Content in Perception'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
  • Consciousness and Content in Perception

    Brewer, B., 14 May 2019, Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. Shottenkirk, D., Curado, M. & Gouveia, S. S. (eds.). 1 ed. Routledge, p. 123-136 14 p.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Cite this