Consciousness and Content in Perception

Bill Brewer

doi:10.1111/phpe.12091

Consciousness and Content in Perception

Bill Brewer

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

175 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Normal perception involves conscious experience of the world. What I call the Content View, (CV), attempts to account for this in terms of the representational content of perception. I offer a new argument against this view. Personal level perceptual content involves the determination of a fineness of grain in the predicational information conveyed to the subject. This depends on her exercise of personal level capacities such as categorization and discrimination that in turn require her conscious selective attention to specific worldly elements. Yet visual consciousness of the world obtains where conscious attention is not directed as well as where it is. So visual consciousness cannot be understood in terms of perceptual content. I elucidate and defend this line of argument and consider its implications for (CV).

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	41-54
Journal	Philosophical Perspectives
Volume	31
Issue number	1
Early online date	25 Apr 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12091
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 25 Apr 2018

Keywords

Perceptual consciousness, perceptual content, predication, categorization, discrimination, conscious attention

Access to Document

10.1111/phpe.12091

Consciousness and Content in_BREWER_Accepted12November2017_GREEN AAMAccepted author manuscript, 332 KB

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1 Chapter

Consciousness and Content in Perception
Brewer, B., 14 May 2019, Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. Shottenkirk, D., Curado, M. & Gouveia, S. S. (eds.). 1 ed. Routledge, p. 123-136 14 p.
Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Cite this

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Consciousness and Content in Perception

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Consciousness and Content in Perception

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