King's College London

Research portal

Consciousness and Content in Perception

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)41-54
JournalPhilosophical Perspectives
Volume31
Issue number1
Early online date25 Apr 2018
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 25 Apr 2018

Documents

King's Authors

Research outputs

Abstract

Normal perception involves conscious experience of the world. What I call the Content View, (CV), attempts to account for this in terms of the representational content of perception. I offer a new argument against this view. Personal level perceptual content involves the determination of a fineness of grain in the predicational information conveyed to the subject. This depends on her exercise of personal level capacities such as categorization and discrimination that in turn require her conscious selective attention to specific worldly elements. Yet visual consciousness of the world obtains where conscious attention is not directed as well as where it is. So visual consciousness cannot be understood in terms of perceptual content. I elucidate and defend this line of argument and consider its implications for (CV).

View graph of relations

© 2018 King's College London | Strand | London WC2R 2LS | England | United Kingdom | Tel +44 (0)20 7836 5454