Contests with Draws: Axiomatization and Equilibrium

Anil Yildizparlak, Alberto Vesperoni

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


We introduce and axiomatize a class of single-winner contest success functions that embody the possibility of a draw. We then analyze the game of contest that our success functions induce, having different prizes delivered in the occurrence of a win and a draw. We identify conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric interior Nash equilibrium and show that equilibrium efforts and equilibrium rent dissipation can be larger than in a Tullock contest (with no possibility of a draw) due to increased competition even if the draw-prize is null. These results suggest that a contest designer may profit from introducing the possibility of a draw. Finally, we show that this approach naturally extends to multiprize contests with multiple draws across different subsets of the set of players. (JEL C72, D72, D74).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1597-1616
Issue number3
Early online date14 Mar 2019
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2019


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