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Correctness first: Brentano on judgment and truth

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Act and Object of Judgment
Subtitle of host publicationHistorical and Philosophical Perspectives
PublisherTaylor and Francis Ltd.
Pages129-150
Number of pages22
ISBN (Electronic)9780429787621
ISBN (Print)9781138351387
DOIs
Published1 Jan 2019

King's Authors

Abstract

Judgment is sometimes distinguished as 'taking something to be true'. While this gloss is suggestive, Brentano argued that truth is not one of the fundamental concepts in a theory of judgment. Judgments in the sense of datable mental events are correct or incorrect. Truth is a derived notion that applies to the contents of judgments: a content is true if, and only if, judging it is correct. In this paper I will explain Brentano's 'correctness first' view and assess what it tells us about judgment as well as truth.

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