Correctness first: Brentano on judgment and truth

TY - CHAP

T1 - Correctness first

T2 - Brentano on judgment and truth

AU - Textor, Mark

PY - 2019/1/1

Y1 - 2019/1/1

N2 - Judgment is sometimes distinguished as 'taking something to be true'. While this gloss is suggestive, Brentano argued that truth is not one of the fundamental concepts in a theory of judgment. Judgments in the sense of datable mental events are correct or incorrect. Truth is a derived notion that applies to the contents of judgments: a content is true if, and only if, judging it is correct. In this paper I will explain Brentano's 'correctness first' view and assess what it tells us about judgment as well as truth.

AB - Judgment is sometimes distinguished as 'taking something to be true'. While this gloss is suggestive, Brentano argued that truth is not one of the fundamental concepts in a theory of judgment. Judgments in the sense of datable mental events are correct or incorrect. Truth is a derived notion that applies to the contents of judgments: a content is true if, and only if, judging it is correct. In this paper I will explain Brentano's 'correctness first' view and assess what it tells us about judgment as well as truth.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85069603286&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.4324/9780429435317-7

DO - 10.4324/9780429435317-7

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85069603286

SN - 9781138351387

SP - 129

EP - 150

BT - The Act and Object of Judgment

PB - Taylor and Francis Ltd.

ER -