Counterinsurgency Challenge in Post-2001 Afghanistan

TY - JOUR

T1 - Counterinsurgency Challenge in Post-2001 Afghanistan

AU - Giustozzi, Antonio

PY - 2017/2/17

Y1 - 2017/2/17

N2 - Although the Taliban insurgency was internally divided and unable to coordinate its activities in 2014–2015, the Afghan security forces were not able to contain it and steadily lost ground throughout 2015. Until 2015, there had been little effort to develop an indigenous Afghan counterinsurgency strategy, but a sense of urgency emerged after a string of Taliban victories. At the beginning of 2016, it was still not clear if and when the National Unity Government would be able to produce a counterinsurgency strategy and, in any case, the need for a coherent counterinsurgency approach became questionable as the Taliban appeared to be transitioning towards conventional warfare.

AB - Although the Taliban insurgency was internally divided and unable to coordinate its activities in 2014–2015, the Afghan security forces were not able to contain it and steadily lost ground throughout 2015. Until 2015, there had been little effort to develop an indigenous Afghan counterinsurgency strategy, but a sense of urgency emerged after a string of Taliban victories. At the beginning of 2016, it was still not clear if and when the National Unity Government would be able to produce a counterinsurgency strategy and, in any case, the need for a coherent counterinsurgency approach became questionable as the Taliban appeared to be transitioning towards conventional warfare.

KW - Afghanistan

KW - insurgency

KW - counterinsurgency

KW - Afghan army

KW - Afghan police

KW - Afghan local police

KW - ISAF

KW - resolute support

KW - power brokers

U2 - 10.1080/09592318.2016.1266126

DO - 10.1080/09592318.2016.1266126

M3 - Article

SN - 0959-2318

VL - 28

SP - 12

EP - 33

JO - Small Wars and Insurgencies

JF - Small Wars and Insurgencies

IS - 1

ER -