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Counterinsurgency Challenge in Post-2001 Afghanistan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)12-33
JournalSmall Wars and Insurgencies
Issue number1
Early online date17 Feb 2017
Accepted/In press5 Nov 2016
E-pub ahead of print17 Feb 2017

King's Authors


Although the Taliban insurgency was internally divided and unable to coordinate its activities in 2014–2015, the Afghan security forces were not able to contain it and steadily lost ground throughout 2015. Until 2015, there had been little effort to develop an indigenous Afghan counterinsurgency strategy, but a sense of urgency emerged after a string of Taliban victories. At the beginning of 2016, it was still not clear if and when the National Unity Government would be able to produce a counterinsurgency strategy and, in any case, the need for a coherent counterinsurgency approach became questionable as the Taliban appeared to be transitioning towards conventional warfare.

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