Deadlock or restraint? The security council veto and the use of force in Syria

TY - JOUR

T1 - Deadlock or restraint? The security council veto and the use of force in Syria

AU - Webb, Philippa

PY - 2014/12/1

Y1 - 2014/12/1

N2 - The situation in Syria has revived the use of the veto power by some of the permanent five members of the Security Council. Repeated vetoes of draft resolutions and even the mere threat of a veto have stalled negotiations and rendered the Security Council largely passive in the face of mass atrocity. This article examines what this situation means for the accountability of the Security Council under international law. It concludes that there is no legal requirement at the present time for P5 members to abstain from the use of veto nor is the Security Council legally responsible for the internationally wrongful acts being committed in Syria. It considers the limited prospects for reforming the veto power through formal and informal changes to practice. The article suggests recasting the veto as a neutral technique, neither good nor bad. Some situations may call for the Security Council to encourage discussion and in-depth consideration of alternatives to the use of force. The veto power may create a more circumspect Council, which may be the more accountable entity in certain circumstances.

AB - The situation in Syria has revived the use of the veto power by some of the permanent five members of the Security Council. Repeated vetoes of draft resolutions and even the mere threat of a veto have stalled negotiations and rendered the Security Council largely passive in the face of mass atrocity. This article examines what this situation means for the accountability of the Security Council under international law. It concludes that there is no legal requirement at the present time for P5 members to abstain from the use of veto nor is the Security Council legally responsible for the internationally wrongful acts being committed in Syria. It considers the limited prospects for reforming the veto power through formal and informal changes to practice. The article suggests recasting the veto as a neutral technique, neither good nor bad. Some situations may call for the Security Council to encourage discussion and in-depth consideration of alternatives to the use of force. The veto power may create a more circumspect Council, which may be the more accountable entity in certain circumstances.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84925339274&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/jcsl/kru018

DO - 10.1093/jcsl/kru018

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84925339274

SN - 1467-7954

VL - 19

SP - 471

EP - 488

JO - JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW

JF - JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW

IS - 3

M1 - kru018

ER -