Democracy and International Conflict

Alberto Vesperoni, Karl Wärneryd

Research output: Working paper/PreprintWorking paper

9 Citations (Scopus)
79 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

During the past two centuries, western nations have successively ex-tended the voting franchise to citizens of lower income. We explain this process of democratization as a rational way for incumbent elites to in-crease their countries’ power in international relations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a lower tax cost of arming may confer a strategic delegation advantage. We find supporting empirical evidence in case Studies of franchise extensions in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherCESifo Group Munich
Publication statusPublished - 31 Mar 2019

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