Abstract
Sophia Moreau's wide-ranging and nuanced book defends a pluralist view of wrongful discrimination. I argue three points. First, I argue that Moreau's account of deliberative freedom does not provide a distinct ground for objecting to discrimination. Second, I argue that there is not as wide a gap between her view and expressivism as she makes there out to be. Third, there is an intriguing gap in the argument that deserves further exploration: Moreau never provides us with an account of when and why social subordination is wrong.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 31-44 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Dialogue-Canadian Philosophical Review |
Volume | 63 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 23 Apr 2024 |
Keywords
- discrimination
- social inequality
- social status
- subordination