Does deterrence change preferences? Evidence from a natural experiment

Elisa Cavatorta; Ben Groom

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103456

Does deterrence change preferences? Evidence from a natural experiment

Elisa Cavatorta, Ben Groom^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

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Abstract

The deterrent effects of counter-violence initiatives could backfire if they cause preferences to change so that the perceived gains from violent actions increase. We test the preference-change hypothesis in a quasi-experimental design exploiting the random location of segments of the wall between the West Bank and Israel, an initiative intended to deter armed resistance. We undertake incentivised decision tasks with Palestinians to measure key individual traits that determine the valuation of political actions: preferences for risk, uncertainty and time delay. We show that people living close to the wall become more risk-tolerant, ambiguity averse and impatient than those unexposed to the wall, and this effect is amplified for people both exposed to and isolated (from the West Bank) by the wall. Preference-change could explain how repressive initiatives appear to perpetuate cycles of violence and resistance.

Original language	English
Article number	103456
Journal	EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Volume	127
Early online date	25 Apr 2020
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103456 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103456
Publication status	Published - 31 Aug 2020

Keywords

violence, preferences, resistance, natural experiment

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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Does deterrence change preferences_CAVATORTA_Accepted14April2020Publishedonline25April2020_GREEN AAM (CC BY-NC-ND)Accepted author manuscript, 1.93 MBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/104139/

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Does deterrence change preferences? Evidence from a natural experiment

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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