Abstract
Using the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in the United States, we show that the reduction in shareholder litigation risk deteriorates firms’ stock price informativeness. This reduction in stock price informativeness is due to firms changing the way they invest rather than obfuscating or withholding firm-specific information. We also show that the reduction in litigation risk is associated with higher investment-price sensitivity. Overall, despite causing a deterioration in firms’ information environment, the reduction in litigation risk does not appear to harm shareholder wealth. Our paper offers novel insights into the net economic benefits of shareholder litigation laws.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 100600 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1-24 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL MARKETS |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 6 Sept 2020 |
Keywords
- Agency theory
- Information environment
- Managerial discretion
- Shareholder litigation
- Universal demand laws