Enhancing Political Cohesion in NATO During the 1950s or: How it Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the (Tactical) Bomb

TY - JOUR

T1 - Enhancing Political Cohesion in NATO During the 1950s or: How it Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the (Tactical) Bomb

AU - Moody, Simon

PY - 2017/9/1

Y1 - 2017/9/1

N2 - This article argues that the perceived need by NATO to nurture political cohesion within the Alliance during the 1950s resulted in the adoption of strategic concepts that were out-of-step with the military environment in which it was operating. It maintains that the Alliance acquiesced to American leadership on nuclear issues which led to the development of tactical nuclear capabilities at the expense of conventional war-fighting capabilities for the defence of the European Central Front. This resulted in a strategic concept that enhanced political cohesion but was militarily unviable.

AB - This article argues that the perceived need by NATO to nurture political cohesion within the Alliance during the 1950s resulted in the adoption of strategic concepts that were out-of-step with the military environment in which it was operating. It maintains that the Alliance acquiesced to American leadership on nuclear issues which led to the development of tactical nuclear capabilities at the expense of conventional war-fighting capabilities for the defence of the European Central Front. This resulted in a strategic concept that enhanced political cohesion but was militarily unviable.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84930608270&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/01402390.2015.1035434

DO - 10.1080/01402390.2015.1035434

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84930608270

SN - 0140-2390

VL - 40

SP - 817

EP - 838

JO - Journal of Strategic Studies

JF - Journal of Strategic Studies

IS - 6

ER -