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Escaping one's own notice knowing: Meno's paradox again

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)233-56
Number of pages24
JournalProceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Volume109
Issue number1pt3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009

King's Authors

Abstract

The complex way Meno's paradox is presented in the Meno forces reflection on both the external conditions on inquiry—its objects—and its internal conditions—the state of mind of the person who inquires. The theory of recollection does not fully account for the internal conditions—as Plato makes clear in the critique of Meno's puzzle to be found in the Euthydemus. I conclude that in the Euthydemus Plato is inviting us to reject the externalist account of knowledge urged on Socrates by the sophists in favour of a more richly internalist epistemology.

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