EXPRESS: Is action understanding an automatic process? Both cognitive and perceptual processing are required for the identification of actions and intentions

TY - JOUR

T1 - EXPRESS: Is action understanding an automatic process? Both cognitive and perceptual processing are required for the identification of actions and intentions

AU - Thompson, Emma

AU - Long, Emily

AU - Bird, Geoffrey

AU - Catmur, Caroline

N1 - Funding Information: The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Leverhulme Trust (Grant No. PLP-2015-019 to C.C.). Publisher Copyright: © Experimental Psychology Society 2022.

PY - 2023/1

Y1 - 2023/1

N2 - The ability to identify others’ actions and intentions, “action understanding,” is crucial for successful social interaction. Under direct accounts, action understanding takes place without the involvement of inferential processes, a claim that has yet to be tested using behavioural measures. Using a dual-task paradigm, the present study aimed to establish whether the identification of others’ actions and intentions depends on automatic or inferential processing, by manipulating working memory load during performance of a task designed to target the identification of actions and intentions. Experiment 1 tested a novel action understanding task targeting action identification and intention identification. This task was then combined with two working memory manipulations (cognitive: Experiment 2; perceptual: Experiment 3) to determine whether action identification and intention identification are disrupted by concurrent cognitive or perceptual load. Both action identification and intention identification were impaired by concurrent cognitive and perceptual processing, indicating that action understanding requires additional perceptual and cognitive resources. These findings contradict a direct account of action understanding.

AB - The ability to identify others’ actions and intentions, “action understanding,” is crucial for successful social interaction. Under direct accounts, action understanding takes place without the involvement of inferential processes, a claim that has yet to be tested using behavioural measures. Using a dual-task paradigm, the present study aimed to establish whether the identification of others’ actions and intentions depends on automatic or inferential processing, by manipulating working memory load during performance of a task designed to target the identification of actions and intentions. Experiment 1 tested a novel action understanding task targeting action identification and intention identification. This task was then combined with two working memory manipulations (cognitive: Experiment 2; perceptual: Experiment 3) to determine whether action identification and intention identification are disrupted by concurrent cognitive or perceptual load. Both action identification and intention identification were impaired by concurrent cognitive and perceptual processing, indicating that action understanding requires additional perceptual and cognitive resources. These findings contradict a direct account of action understanding.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85124829384&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1177/17470218221078019

DO - 10.1177/17470218221078019

M3 - Article

SN - 0033-555x

VL - 76

SP - 70

EP - 83

JO - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

JF - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

IS - 1

ER -