False Beliefs and the Reasons We Don't Have

TY - CHAP

T1 - False Beliefs and the Reasons We Don't Have

AU - Alvarez, Maria

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - Recent debates about reasons has led to a consensus that reasons for acting or believing –‘normative reasons’– are facts. Some authors, ‘anti-factualists’, have argued that we should take the factive turn if the topic is the normative reasons that there are for someone to do something but not, if the topic is the normative reasons one has, since those may be false beliefs. I argue that the distinction between reasons there are and reasons one has doesn’t support this anti-factualist case. I also argue that, contrary to what its detractors say, factualism can explain why agents who act on false beliefs often act rationally. The conclusion is that these arguments don’t show that anyone has a reason to abandon 'factualism'.

AB - Recent debates about reasons has led to a consensus that reasons for acting or believing –‘normative reasons’– are facts. Some authors, ‘anti-factualists’, have argued that we should take the factive turn if the topic is the normative reasons that there are for someone to do something but not, if the topic is the normative reasons one has, since those may be false beliefs. I argue that the distinction between reasons there are and reasons one has doesn’t support this anti-factualist case. I also argue that, contrary to what its detractors say, factualism can explain why agents who act on false beliefs often act rationally. The conclusion is that these arguments don’t show that anyone has a reason to abandon 'factualism'.

U2 - 10.1017/9781316818992.010

DO - 10.1017/9781316818992.010

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9781316622018

SP - 161

EP - 176

BT - The Factive Turn in Epistemology

A2 - Mitova, Veli

PB - Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

ER -