Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 727-757 |
Number of pages | 31 |
Journal | MIND |
Volume | 130 |
Issue number | 519 |
Early online date | 20 Mar 2021 |
DOIs | |
Accepted/In press | 20 Jul 2020 |
E-pub ahead of print | 20 Mar 2021 |
Published | 1 Jul 2021 |
Additional links |
Truth-theoretic deflationism holds that truth is simple, and yet that it can fulfil many useful logico-linguistic roles. Deflationism focuses on axioms for truth: there is no reduction of the notion of truth to more fundamental ones such as sets or higher-order quantifiers. In this paper I argue that the fundamental properties of reasonable, primitive truth predicates are at odds with the core tenets of classical truth-theoretic deflationism that I call fix, express, and quantify. Truth may be regarded as a broadly logical, sui generis notion. However, this has little to do with the original aims of the deflationary theory of truth.
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