From Rents to Welfare: Why Are Some Oil-Rich States Generous to Their People?

Ferdinand Eibl; Steffen Hertog

doi:10.1017/S0003055423000977

From Rents to Welfare: Why Are Some Oil-Rich States Generous to Their People?

Ferdinand Eibl, Steffen Hertog

Political Economy

LSE London School of Economics & Political Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Why do some, but not all oil-rich states provide generous welfare to their populations? Building on a case study of Oman in the 1960s and 1970s, we argue that anti-systemic subversive threats motivate ruling elites in oil states to use welfare as a tool of mass co-optation. We use the generalized synthetic control method and difference-in-difference regressions for a global quantitative test of our argument, assessing the effect of different types of subversion on a range of long-term welfare outcomes in oil-rich and oil-poor states. We demonstrate that the positive effect of subversion appears limited to center-seeking subversive threats in oil-rich countries. The paper addresses a key puzzle in the literature on resource-rich states, which makes contradictory predictions about the impact of resource rents on welfare provision.

Original language	English
Number of pages	20
Journal	AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
Early online date	29 Sept 2023
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000977
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 29 Sept 2023

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10.1017/S0003055423000977Licence: CC BY

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abstract = "Why do some, but not all oil-rich states provide generous welfare to their populations? Building on a case study of Oman in the 1960s and 1970s, we argue that anti-systemic subversive threats motivate ruling elites in oil states to use welfare as a tool of mass co-optation. We use the generalized synthetic control method and difference-in-difference regressions for a global quantitative test of our argument, assessing the effect of different types of subversion on a range of long-term welfare outcomes in oil-rich and oil-poor states. We demonstrate that the positive effect of subversion appears limited to center-seeking subversive threats in oil-rich countries. The paper addresses a key puzzle in the literature on resource-rich states, which makes contradictory predictions about the impact of resource rents on welfare provision.",

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From Rents to Welfare: Why Are Some Oil-Rich States Generous to Their People?

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