Gameful Simulations for Exploring Nuclear Arms Control Treaty Verification as a Systems Problem

Rita Borgo; Graham McNeill; Keir Allen; James Palmer; Torry  Wade; Wyn Bowen

Gameful Simulations for Exploring Nuclear Arms Control Treaty Verification as a Systems Problem

Rita Borgo, Graham McNeill, Keir Allen, James Palmer, Torry Wade, Wyn Bowen

AWE plc

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference paper › peer-review

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Abstract

A nuclear arms control treaty obliges signatory states to abide by agreed upon commitments (such as reducing their total number of warheads) and specifies the actions an ‘inspectorate’ may take to verify compliance. However, a nuclear weapons programme is a technically and logistically complex system and even a state committed to compliance will likely wish to disclose as little as possible about its programme while staying within the legal framework of the treaty. There is also a risk that the state intentionally violates the terms of the treaty, but takes actions to hide this. Hence, designing verifiable treaties and actually verifying compliance while they are in force is a difficult task. To explore these issues, we frame treaty verification as a systems problem and use gameful simulations to explore different scenarios and strategies (of the state and the inspectorate) to further our understanding of the fundamental challenges in verification with the ultimate aim of designing better treaties and verification strategies. In this work we discuss two strands of ongoing collaborative research between arms control and human-computer interaction experts. Strand 1 involves detailed, low-level simulations of nuclear weapons programs to understand the intricacies of treaty compliance and verification. Strand 2 employs a top-down, turn-based inspection game to model verification challenges, allowing for rapid scenario testing and strategic analysis. Both approaches aim to balance simplifying assumptions with sufficient detail to ensure meaningful insights, ultimately informing the design of more effective treaties and verification strategies. Findings emphasize the importance of an effective user interface to manage complex information and support decisionmaking.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Institute of Nuclear Material Management Annual Meeting Proceedings
Number of pages	12
Publication status	Published - Aug 2024

Keywords

Non-proliferation
Gamification
Visualization and interaction
Visual Analytics Software

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abstract = "A nuclear arms control treaty obliges signatory states to abide by agreed upon commitments (such as reducing their total number of warheads) and specifies the actions an {\textquoteleft}inspectorate{\textquoteright} may take to verify compliance. However, a nuclear weapons programme is a technically and logistically complex system and even a state committed to compliance will likely wish to disclose as little as possible about its programme while staying within the legal framework of the treaty. There is also a risk that the state intentionally violates the terms of the treaty, but takes actions to hide this. Hence, designing verifiable treaties and actually verifying compliance while they are in force is a difficult task. To explore these issues, we frame treaty verification as a systems problem and use gameful simulations to explore different scenarios and strategies (of the state and the inspectorate) to further our understanding of the fundamental challenges in verification with the ultimate aim of designing better treaties and verification strategies. In this work we discuss two strands of ongoing collaborative research between arms control and human-computer interaction experts. Strand 1 involves detailed, low-level simulations of nuclear weapons programs to understand the intricacies of treaty compliance and verification. Strand 2 employs a top-down, turn-based inspection game to model verification challenges, allowing for rapid scenario testing and strategic analysis. Both approaches aim to balance simplifying assumptions with sufficient detail to ensure meaningful insights, ultimately informing the design of more effective treaties and verification strategies. Findings emphasize the importance of an effective user interface to manage complex information and support decisionmaking.",

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AU - Borgo, Rita

AU - McNeill, Graham

AU - Allen, Keir

AU - Palmer, James

AU - Wade, Torry

AU - Bowen, Wyn

PY - 2024/8

Y1 - 2024/8

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AB - A nuclear arms control treaty obliges signatory states to abide by agreed upon commitments (such as reducing their total number of warheads) and specifies the actions an ‘inspectorate’ may take to verify compliance. However, a nuclear weapons programme is a technically and logistically complex system and even a state committed to compliance will likely wish to disclose as little as possible about its programme while staying within the legal framework of the treaty. There is also a risk that the state intentionally violates the terms of the treaty, but takes actions to hide this. Hence, designing verifiable treaties and actually verifying compliance while they are in force is a difficult task. To explore these issues, we frame treaty verification as a systems problem and use gameful simulations to explore different scenarios and strategies (of the state and the inspectorate) to further our understanding of the fundamental challenges in verification with the ultimate aim of designing better treaties and verification strategies. In this work we discuss two strands of ongoing collaborative research between arms control and human-computer interaction experts. Strand 1 involves detailed, low-level simulations of nuclear weapons programs to understand the intricacies of treaty compliance and verification. Strand 2 employs a top-down, turn-based inspection game to model verification challenges, allowing for rapid scenario testing and strategic analysis. Both approaches aim to balance simplifying assumptions with sufficient detail to ensure meaningful insights, ultimately informing the design of more effective treaties and verification strategies. Findings emphasize the importance of an effective user interface to manage complex information and support decisionmaking.

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KW - Gamification

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KW - Visual Analytics Software

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M3 - Conference paper

BT - Institute of Nuclear Material Management Annual Meeting Proceedings

ER -

Gameful Simulations for Exploring Nuclear Arms Control Treaty Verification as a Systems Problem

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