Abstract
It is often maintained that practical freedom is a capacity to act on our view of what we ought to do and in particular on our view of what it would be best to do. Here, I discuss an important exception to that claim, namely habitual agency. Acting out of habit is widely regarded as a form of reflex or even as compulsive behaviour but much habitual agency is both intentional and free. Still it is true that, in so far as we act out of habit, we have no capacity to determine what we do by making a judgement about whether we ought to be doing it. Habitual agency is nonetheless free because we have the capacity to determine whether we act out of habit by making a judgement about whether or not the habit is a virtue. I develop this view of habit by contrasting habitual agency with action on policy and I argue that much virtuous agency is best understood as a form of habitual agency rather than as a form of action on policy.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 93-108 |
| Journal | Philosophical Explorations |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue number | Sup2 |
| Early online date | 13 Oct 2017 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2017 |