Heidegger on Assertion, Method, and Metaphysics

TY - JOUR

T1 - Heidegger on Assertion, Method, and Metaphysics

AU - Golob, Sacha

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - In Sein und Zeit Heidegger makes several claims about the nature of ‘assertion’ [Aussage]. These claims are of particular philosophical interest: they illustrate, for example, important points of contact and divergence between Heidegger’s work and philosophical movements including Kantianism, the early Analytic tradition, and contemporary pragmatism. This article provides a new assessment of one of these claims: the claim that assertion is connected to a ‘present-at-hand’ ontology. I also indicate how my analysis sets the stage for a new reading of Heidegger’s further claim that assertion is an explanatorily derivative phenomenon. I begin with a loose overview of Heidegger’s position. Section 1 develops a sharper formulation of the key premises. In sections 2 and 3, I argue that existing treatments of the supposed link between assertion and the ‘present-at-hand’ are unsatisfactory. In section 4 I advance a new, ‘methodological’, interpretation of that link. In section 5 I sketch the implications of my interpretation for the further claim that assertion is explanatorily derivative.

AB - In Sein und Zeit Heidegger makes several claims about the nature of ‘assertion’ [Aussage]. These claims are of particular philosophical interest: they illustrate, for example, important points of contact and divergence between Heidegger’s work and philosophical movements including Kantianism, the early Analytic tradition, and contemporary pragmatism. This article provides a new assessment of one of these claims: the claim that assertion is connected to a ‘present-at-hand’ ontology. I also indicate how my analysis sets the stage for a new reading of Heidegger’s further claim that assertion is an explanatorily derivative phenomenon. I begin with a loose overview of Heidegger’s position. Section 1 develops a sharper formulation of the key premises. In sections 2 and 3, I argue that existing treatments of the supposed link between assertion and the ‘present-at-hand’ are unsatisfactory. In section 4 I advance a new, ‘methodological’, interpretation of that link. In section 5 I sketch the implications of my interpretation for the further claim that assertion is explanatorily derivative.

KW - Heidegger

KW - Present-at-hand

KW - Assertion

KW - Non-conceptual

KW - Nonconceptual

KW - Being and Time

KW - Vorhandensein

U2 - 10.1111/ejop.12018

DO - 10.1111/ejop.12018

M3 - Article

SN - 0966-8373

VL - N/A

SP - N/A

JO - EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

JF - EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

IS - N/A

M1 - N/A

ER -