Henry of Ghent on the Relational Character of Causal Powers

TY - JOUR

T1 - Henry of Ghent on the Relational Character of Causal Powers

AU - Lowe, Can

AU - Shaftoe , Gillian

PY - 2023/9/28

Y1 - 2023/9/28

N2 - Henry of Ghent contends that a causal power is a relation that a substance bears to an act. Scholars have taken this relational account to commit Henry to the Megaric view that a power exists only if it is actualized. We argue that this reading is mistaken because, for Henry, a power is not a “real relation” between a substance and an act. Rather, it is a “relation of reason.” We then consider the worry that if a power is a relation of reason, it is a partially mind-dependent entity. We argue that this worry is unfounded because Henry’s claim that a power is a relation of reason is not so much a claim about what a power metaphysically speaking is but rather a claim about how we must conceptualize it.

AB - Henry of Ghent contends that a causal power is a relation that a substance bears to an act. Scholars have taken this relational account to commit Henry to the Megaric view that a power exists only if it is actualized. We argue that this reading is mistaken because, for Henry, a power is not a “real relation” between a substance and an act. Rather, it is a “relation of reason.” We then consider the worry that if a power is a relation of reason, it is a partially mind-dependent entity. We argue that this worry is unfounded because Henry’s claim that a power is a relation of reason is not so much a claim about what a power metaphysically speaking is but rather a claim about how we must conceptualize it.

M3 - Article

SN - 0022-5053

JO - JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

JF - JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

ER -