TY - JOUR
T1 - How do the media scrutinise central banking?
T2 - Evidence from the Bank of England
AU - Koop, Christel
AU - Scotto di Vettimo, Michele
N1 - Funding Information:
The study was supported by Leverhulme Research Fellowship, UK RF-2020-427\7. We would like to thank Martin Weale, Francesca Vantaggiato, Matia Vannoni, Davide Romelli, Maren Froemel, Benjamin Braun, and the reviewers and editor for their comments on earlier versions of the paper. We have also benefited from feedback provided during research seminars at King's, Southampton, and Royal Holloway, as well as the PSA Executive Politics & Governance Seminar and the ICCP5’s ‘Text as data’ panels.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 The Author(s)
PY - 2023/3
Y1 - 2023/3
N2 - Central bank independence has raised questions of accountability ever since its global diffusion in the 1990s, and especially since the financial crisis. Yet, whilst the literature on central banks' legislative oversight has expanded, the role of the media as account holders has been left largely unexplored. We assess media scrutiny by using an original dataset of news articles about the Bank of England published between 1997 and 2020, and by analysing the relationship between central banking outcomes and scrutiny in the form of evaluative and negative coverage of the Bank. We find that the variation in such coverage can be traced back to policy outcomes, but the association is largely confined to the post-crisis period. The findings support a view of the media as instrumental in central bank oversight, but also show the limits of this form of accountability.
AB - Central bank independence has raised questions of accountability ever since its global diffusion in the 1990s, and especially since the financial crisis. Yet, whilst the literature on central banks' legislative oversight has expanded, the role of the media as account holders has been left largely unexplored. We assess media scrutiny by using an original dataset of news articles about the Bank of England published between 1997 and 2020, and by analysing the relationship between central banking outcomes and scrutiny in the form of evaluative and negative coverage of the Bank. We find that the variation in such coverage can be traced back to policy outcomes, but the association is largely confined to the post-crisis period. The findings support a view of the media as instrumental in central bank oversight, but also show the limits of this form of accountability.
KW - central banking
KW - accountability
KW - media scrutiny
KW - performance
KW - automated text analysis
KW - Bank of England
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85139033132&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102296
DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102296
M3 - Article
SN - 0176-2680
VL - 77
SP - 1
EP - 15
JO - European Journal of Political Economy
JF - European Journal of Political Economy
M1 - 102296
ER -