How to Keep Officers in the Barracks? Causes, Agents, and Types of Military Coups

TY - JOUR

T1 - How to Keep Officers in the Barracks?

T2 - Causes, Agents, and Types of Military Coups

AU - Albrecht, Holger

AU - Eibl, Ferdinand

PY - 2018/6/1

Y1 - 2018/6/1

N2 - What are the most efficient strategies to prevent coups d’état? The answer depends on whether the coup is attempted by elite officers or by lower ranking combat officers. Elite officers and lower ranking combat officers have different incentives, opportunities, and capacities to perpetrate a coup. As a result, the success of coup-proofing critically depends on coup agency. Using original data on coup agency, public spending and officer salaries in the Middle East and North Africa, we find counter-balancing and higher shares of defense spending to be effective for preventing elite officer coups. Combat officer coups are best prevented by increasing social spending. Political liberalization has an ambivalent effect on military agents, decreasing coup risk for combat officer, but making elite officer coups more likely. Our findings suggest the necessity to differentiate between specific coup types and rethink coups as purely elite-led power grabs to fully explore the rationale of junior coup plotters.

AB - What are the most efficient strategies to prevent coups d’état? The answer depends on whether the coup is attempted by elite officers or by lower ranking combat officers. Elite officers and lower ranking combat officers have different incentives, opportunities, and capacities to perpetrate a coup. As a result, the success of coup-proofing critically depends on coup agency. Using original data on coup agency, public spending and officer salaries in the Middle East and North Africa, we find counter-balancing and higher shares of defense spending to be effective for preventing elite officer coups. Combat officer coups are best prevented by increasing social spending. Political liberalization has an ambivalent effect on military agents, decreasing coup risk for combat officer, but making elite officer coups more likely. Our findings suggest the necessity to differentiate between specific coup types and rethink coups as purely elite-led power grabs to fully explore the rationale of junior coup plotters.

KW - Coup

KW - Civil-Military Relations

KW - Middle East

KW - Coup-proofing

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85050809654&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/isq/sqx085

DO - 10.1093/isq/sqx085

M3 - Article

SN - 0020-8833

VL - 62

SP - 315

EP - 328

JO - INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

JF - INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

IS - 2

ER -