Incommensurability Naturalized

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingOther chapter contribution

Abstract

In this paper I argue that we can understand incommensurability in a naturalistic, psychological manner. Cognitive habits can be acquired and so differ between individuals. Drawing on psychological work concerning analogical thinking and thinking with schemata, I argue that incommensurability arises between individuals with different cognitive habits and between groups with different shared cognitive habits.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationRethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison
EditorsLéna Soler, Howard Sankey, Paul Hoyningen-Huene
Place of PublicationDordrecht
PublisherSpinger
Pages21-39
Number of pages19
Volume255
Publication statusPublished - 2007

Publication series

NameBoston Studies in the Philosophy of Science
PublisherSpinger

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