Indian statecraft struggles to come to terms with India’s rise

Harsh V. Pant

doi:10.4324/9780203807804-20

Indian statecraft struggles to come to terms with India’s rise

Harsh V. Pant^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

King's India Institute

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In November 2008, the financial capital of India, Mumbai, was struck by terrorists whom the Indian (as well as American and British) intelligence later confirmed had received extensive training from the Pakistan-based group, Lashkar-e-Toiba (Army of the Pure). Given the sophistication of planning and execution involved, it became apparent that this commando-style operation had the possible involvement of another state. As physical evidence mounted in terms of satellite phone calls, equipments, and boats used for the attack, Pakistan’s hand was seen in the operation. Although India conceded that the newly installed civilian administration in Islamabad of Asif Ali Zardari was probably not behind the attacks, the army and Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s principal intelligence agency, were seen as the main culprit.1.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft
Publisher	Taylor and Francis Ltd
Pages	120-130
Number of pages	11
ISBN (Electronic)	9781136664373
ISBN (Print)	9780415781107
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203807804-20
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2012

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Indian statecraft struggles to come to terms with India’s rise

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