Abstract
When US President Joe Biden hosted a lavish state visit for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in June 2023, he described US-India relations as among the “most consequential in the world.”Footnote1 It seemed that the United States had finally secured India as a strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific,Footnote2 the region at the nexus of contemporary great power rivalry. Washington’s overtures toward Delhi fit into Biden’s strategy of working with like-minded states in overlapping coalitions of the willing. India is the world’s fifth largest economy—projected to be third by the late-2020sFootnote3—and is already the most populous nation. Modi’s visit was portrayed as a resounding success in the American and Indian press, with several business and military deals signed.
Yet little had changed in strategic terms. India had no intention of giving up its traditional stance of “strategic autonomy,” and remained cautious about cultivating overly friendly ties with the US. From India’s point of view, Washington’s expanding military presence in the Indo-Pacific and minilateral frameworks like AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”)—all of which implicitly seek to contain China—are problematic.Footnote4 Delhi is concerned about provoking Beijing’s ire, and relatedly, about the danger of China’s deepening ties with Russia, with which India holds strategic ties forged during the Cold War. Modi is especially wary about adopting any policy position that endangers China-India trade. Strategic autonomy is here to stay for India. Yet, Delhi is also concerned about security and is seeking new ways to shape the order transition occurring in the regional system which will promote its status and protect its distinctive identity.
In this article, we examine why India is amenable toward the Quad—of which it is a member together with the US, Japan and Australia—but is far more reticent toward AUKUS, a trilateral security pact between the US, Australia and the UK. It also seeks to answer whether these US-led minilateral frameworks help or hinder the regional order that India ultimately seeks to build—and analyzes how Delhi is seeking to shape them.
Yet little had changed in strategic terms. India had no intention of giving up its traditional stance of “strategic autonomy,” and remained cautious about cultivating overly friendly ties with the US. From India’s point of view, Washington’s expanding military presence in the Indo-Pacific and minilateral frameworks like AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”)—all of which implicitly seek to contain China—are problematic.Footnote4 Delhi is concerned about provoking Beijing’s ire, and relatedly, about the danger of China’s deepening ties with Russia, with which India holds strategic ties forged during the Cold War. Modi is especially wary about adopting any policy position that endangers China-India trade. Strategic autonomy is here to stay for India. Yet, Delhi is also concerned about security and is seeking new ways to shape the order transition occurring in the regional system which will promote its status and protect its distinctive identity.
In this article, we examine why India is amenable toward the Quad—of which it is a member together with the US, Japan and Australia—but is far more reticent toward AUKUS, a trilateral security pact between the US, Australia and the UK. It also seeks to answer whether these US-led minilateral frameworks help or hinder the regional order that India ultimately seeks to build—and analyzes how Delhi is seeking to shape them.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 21-39 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | The Washington Quarterly |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Publication status | Published - 19 Dec 2023 |
