Abstract
Many of our sources of knowledge only afford us knowledge that is inexact. When trying to see how tall something is, or to hear how far away something is, or to remember how long something lasted, we may come to know some facts about the approximate size, distance or duration of the thing in question but we don’t come to know exactly what its size, distance or duration is. In some such situations we also have some pointed knowledge of how inexact our knowledge is. That is, we can knowledgeably pinpoint some exact claims that we do not know. We show that standard models of inexact knowledge leave little or no room for such pointed knowledge. We devise alternative models that are not afflicted by this shortcoming.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 812-830 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Inquiry |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue number | 8 |
| Early online date | 5 May 2020 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 13 Sept 2020 |
Keywords
- Inexact Knowledge
- Higher-order Knowledge
- Luminosity
- Margin-for-error
- higher-order knowledge
- margin-for-error
- Inexact knowledge
- luminosity
