Information-based Incentivisation when Rewards are Inadequate

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Abstract

In many cases, intermediaries play a major role in linking between service providers and their target users. Yet, attracting intermediaries at a marketplace to promote a service to their existing customers can be very challenging, since they are usually very busy and would incur additional cost as a result of such promotion. In response, this paper presents an information-based incentivisation framework, which combines financial rewards with other motivating information, in order to incentivise intermediaries at a marketplace to undertake service promotion. Specifically, the intermediaries are associated with a group of incentivising agents, capable of learning the individual motivational needs of these intermediaries, and accordingly target them with the most effective incentives. The incentivising agents collaborate with each other to gather motivational information, by sharing their observations on intermediaries. The proposed incentivisation approach is evaluated through a corresponding agent-based simulation, and the experimental results obtained demonstrate its effectiveness.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFrontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
PublisherIOS Press
Pages591-596
Number of pages6
Volume263
ISBN (Print)9781614994183
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Event21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2014 - Prague, Czech Republic
Duration: 18 Aug 201422 Aug 2014

Publication series

NameFrontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
Volume263
ISSN (Print)09226389

Conference

Conference21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2014
Country/TerritoryCzech Republic
CityPrague
Period18/08/201422/08/2014

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